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About & methodology
Last updated 2026-06-15 01:48 UTC · this page is regenerated by the same pipeline it describes.
What this is
Clankerusecase is a free, continuously-updated detection engineering resource. A pipeline watches 11+ threat-intelligence sources (The Hacker News, BleepingComputer, Microsoft Security Blog, Cisco Talos, Securelist, SentinelLabs, Unit 42, ESET, Lab52, CISA KEV, GitHub Security Advisories) and, within ~2 hours of an article publishing, turns it into MITRE ATT&CK-mapped detection use cases with queries for Microsoft Defender (KQL), Microsoft Sentinel (KQL), Splunk (SPL/CIM), Sigma, Datadog Cloud SIEM, and CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale — plus extracted, defanged IOCs and kill-chain context.
Who runs it
This is a solo project by Virtualhaggis — a security practitioner building the tool they wanted on shift: a way to go from "I just read about this campaign" to "here is the query I run" in one click. It runs in spare time, with no company behind it, no SLA, and no warranty. The generator code, the detection content, and the full pipeline are open source: github.com/Virtualhaggis/usecaseintel.
How detections are generated
Two paths feed the library:
- Curated catalogue — hand-built use cases (YAML in the repo) that fire when an article matches known behavioural triggers. Written and reviewed by a human.
- AI-generated use cases (badged AI on the site) — for each new article, Claude reads the full article text, code blocks, IOC tables and screenshots, cross-checks claims against vendor advisories via web search, and drafts detections specific to that campaign. These then go through the validation gauntlet below, with failed queries re-prompted and unsafe or malformed ones dropped.
Every detection links back to its source article, so you can verify the logic against the original reporting in under a minute.
What we validate — and what we don't
Every published query is checked for:
- Defender / Sentinel KQL: real grammar parse (Microsoft Kusto.Language) + table and column names validated against a 58-table, 1,600+-column schema, with automatic near-miss correction.
- Splunk SPL: structural validation (balanced quotes/parentheses/macros, CIM datamodel allowlist).
- Sigma: parses via pySigma with required-field checks.
- CloudWatch Logs Insights: keyword/field heuristics against the CloudTrail schema.
- All platforms: a safety denylist — queries containing side-effectful commands (e.g.
outputlookup, sendemail, externaldata()) are never published.
- MITRE technique IDs validated against the current ATT&CK release.
What we do NOT do (yet):
- Execute queries against live telemetry or replayed attack data — schema-valid is not the same as field-tested.
- Measure real-world false-positive rates. The per-UC confidence and FP guidance are model-assessed estimates, not measurements.
- Guarantee performance — some hunting queries are expensive on large tenants.
Bottom line: treat everything here as a strong, context-rich starting point. Test in staging, tune the allowlists to your environment, then promote to production.
What the labels mean
- Alerting tier — specific enough (named binaries, hashes, thresholds, temporal correlation) that it is a candidate for alerting after tuning. Hunting tier — needs analyst review; expect noise.
- Confidence (High/Medium/Low) — the generator's assessment of how tightly the query matches the attack described in the source article. It is not a measured precision figure.
- AI badge — generated by the pipeline for a specific article, cross-checked against vendor advisories. Weekly — synthesised across the fortnight's articles.
- SVS (SOC Value Score) — a 0-100 composite of probability, impact, detectability, and effort, for ranking the library. Heuristic, not gospel.
Using the content
Everything is MIT-licensed — code and detection content. Deploy the queries in your SOC, adapt them, ship them in internal detection libraries, use them commercially. Attribution is appreciated but not required. Machine-readable exports, refreshed every run:
Found a bad detection?
Tell us — that is how an AI-assisted library earns trust. Open a GitHub issue with the UC title and what is wrong (false positives, broken syntax, wrong field, missed coverage). Reports get triaged and fixes ship through the normal pipeline runs.
No warranty of any kind. Detections are provided as-is; validate before relying on them in production. Defanged IOCs are intentionally not clickable.