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🇷🇺TA505

🇷🇺 TA505 is a tracked threat actor in the Clankerusecase corpus. Attributed to RU. Primary motivation: Criminal. We map 22 detection use cases to this actor across 42 MITRE ATT&CK techniques, with 1 threat-intel article citing them. Active in our corpus from 2026-06-18 to 2026-06-18.

high 1
View full actor card → All threat actors MITRE ATT&CK group spec (G0092) ↗
22Use cases
1Articles
42Techniques
0IOCs

Known aliases

TA505Hive0065Evil CorpIndrik SpiderGOLD DRAKEManatee TempestDEV-0243UNC2165

Top techniques

All other tracked techniques

Detection use cases (22)

TA505/Indrik Spider SDBbot/Dridex loader: rundll32 from Office or script-host invoking DLL/.dat in user-writable path AI · profile SΣDD Clop/TA505 LEMURLOOT webshell drop on MOVEit Transfer (CVE-2023-34362 exploit chain) AI · profile SΣDD Fake browser update JavaScript spawned from browser download directory (SocGholish) Bespoke Script interpreter outbound HTTPS within 60s of Update.js execution (SocGholish) Bespoke WordPress site serving injected SocGholish loader to internal browser Bespoke Script interpreter spawning PE loader after browser-delivered JS (SocGholish second stage) Bespoke Shadow copy deletion within 24h of SocGholish script execution (Evil Corp ransomware prelude) Bespoke Ransomware-style mass file rename / extension change Internal LSASS process access / dump (credential theft) Internal Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement Internal 1Password impossible-travel sign-in MITRE match Brand-Impersonation Domain Fetch Followed by User-Context Loader Within 10 Minutes MITRE match Cross-category credential-store enumeration with rapid egress to anonymizing tunnel/CDN MITRE match Cross-Platform ClickFix Paste-to-Pipe Loader (UI-Parent Shell with Decode-and-Execute Payload) MITRE match Developer package install spawning script-host with non-registry C2 within 5 minutes MITRE match Developer/Data-tooling Daemon Spawns Shell Child Seconds After POST to Runner/Exec Endpoint MITRE match Internet-Facing Service Process Spawning Unix Shell or Ingress-Tool LOLBin (Edge Zero-Day Post-Exploit) MITRE match Low-Code / AI Workflow Runtime Sandbox-Escape — Server Process Spawns Shell + Public Egress MITRE match npm/yarn/pnpm Install-Hook Spawn → Credential-Store Read or Worm-Payload Drop in node_modules MITRE match Package Manager / Dev-Tool Auto-Execution Triggers Non-Registry Egress or Credential-Store Access MITRE match Package Manager Install Hook Spawns Scripting Interpreter Then Touches Credential Files or Egresses Off-Registry MITRE match Package Manager Install Spawning Outbound Egress to Non-Registry Infrastructure Within 5 Minutes MITRE match

Threat-intel articles (1)