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🌐TeamPCP

🌐 TeamPCP is a tracked threat actor in the Clankerusecase corpus. ??-aligned. Primary motivation: Unknown. We map 12 detection use cases to this actor across 36 MITRE ATT&CK techniques, with 0 threat-intel articles citing them.

View full actor card → All threat actors MITRE ATT&CK group spec (G1056) ↗
12Use cases
0Articles
36Techniques
0IOCs

About this actor (MITRE)

[TeamPCP](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056) is a financially-motivated, cloud-native threat group that has been active since at least September 2025. Initially focused on ransomware and cryptocurrency theft, [TeamPCP](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056) shifted in early 2026 to systematic, worm-driven credential theft and software supply chain attacks targeting Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) workflows. [TeamPCP](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056) has monetized access through extortion and through partnerships with ransomware actors including Vect and CipherF

Known aliases

TeamPCPPCPCatShellForceDeadCatx3SHADOW-WATER-058UNC6780

Top techniques

All other tracked techniques

Detection use cases (12)

1Password impossible-travel sign-in MITRE match Brand-Impersonation Domain Fetch Followed by User-Context Loader Within 10 Minutes MITRE match Cross-Platform ClickFix Paste-to-Pipe Loader (UI-Parent Shell with Decode-and-Execute Payload) MITRE match Dev/CI Toolchain Credential Read + Egress to Non-Canonical Registry MITRE match Developer package install spawning script-host with non-registry C2 within 5 minutes MITRE match Edge-service post-exploitation chain: internet-facing daemon → child shell or token redemption within 10 min of external request MITRE match Install-Triggered Registry Publish or Git Push (Supply-Chain Worm Self-Propagation) MITRE match Internet-Facing Service Process Spawning Unix Shell or Ingress-Tool LOLBin (Edge Zero-Day Post-Exploit) MITRE match Internet-facing service process spawns shell/LOLBin within minutes of public inbound connection — post-RCE command execution MITRE match Linux LPE chain — anomalous algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc kernel-module load followed by same-user root transition MITRE match Low-Code / AI Workflow Runtime Sandbox-Escape — Server Process Spawns Shell + Public Egress MITRE match Non-Browser Process Reads Browser Credential / Cookie SQLite Then Egresses to Public Destination Within 10 Minutes MITRE match