# [CRIT] A serious security flaw in runC can result in root privilege escalation in Docker and Kubernetes

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2019-02-13
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/a-serious-security-flaw-in-runc-can-result-in-root-privilege-escalation-in-docker-and-kubernetes/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Liran Tal 
February 13, 2019
0 mins read A security flaw discovered by Adam Iwaniuk and Borys Popławski and found in open source software  runC  was disclosed on February 11th, 2019 and described in  CVE-2019-5736 .
The vulnerability, affecting several container engines such as Docker and Kubernetes, is found in a key component of container engines and allows containers to break out of their isolated context and gain access to the host server which they run o…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2019-5736`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2019-5736`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 2 use case(s) fired, 2 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.