# [MED] Understanding Amazon S3 security and compliance on AWS

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2019-05-10
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/understanding-amazon-s3-security/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Drew Wright 
May 10, 2019
0 mins read Editor's note This blog originally appeared on fugue.co. Fugue joined Snyk in 2022 and is a key component of Snyk IaC .
If your organization uses Amazon Web Services (AWS) for cloud computing, chances are that Amazon S3, or Amazon Simple Storage Service, gets a lot of use. The object storage service was one of the first cloud services offered by AWS (way back in 2006!), and it’s ease of use, reliability, and scalability h…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1543.003** — Windows Service

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Service install for persistence — sc.exe / new service registry write

`UC_SERVICE_PERSIST` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name="sc.exe" AND Processes.process="*create*"
      AND (Processes.process="*\Users\*" OR Processes.process="*\AppData\*"
        OR Processes.process="*\ProgramData\*" OR Processes.process="*\Temp\*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| append
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
        where Registry.registry_path="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\*"
          AND Registry.registry_value_name="ImagePath"
          AND (Registry.registry_value_data="*\Users\*"
            OR Registry.registry_value_data="*\AppData\*"
            OR Registry.registry_value_data="*\Temp\*")
        by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName =~ "sc.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "create"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(\Users\|\AppData\|\ProgramData\|\Temp\)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **MED** based on: 1 use case(s) fired, 1 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.