# [HIGH] Java Top 10 Security Vulnerabilities Disclosed [2019 - List]

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2019-05-27
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/162-security-vulnerabilities-disclosed-in-javas-top-10-libraries-including-jackson-spring-and-jetty/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Simon Maple 
May 27, 2019
0 mins read Our friends at OverOps post a yearly blog listing the popularity of Java libraries, based on GitHub mentions. Accordingly, in this post, we’ll take a look at the vulnerabilities that have been found in the top ten Java libraries picked by OverOps, and focus on three of them in more depth. Firstly, following are the top ten OverOps picks, ordered by popularity:
Jackson
Hadoop
org.junit
org.junit.runner
org.springframework
…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: 1 use case(s) fired, 2 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.