# [CRIT] Concerns of supply-chain attacks amplify as remote code execution was found in Ruby gem strong_password

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2019-07-07
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/ruby-gem-strong_password-found-to-contain-remote-code-execution-code-in-a-malicious-version-further-strengthening-worries-of-growth-in-supply-chain-attacks/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Liran Tal 
July 7, 2019
0 mins read On July 5th, 2019, the CVE-2019-13354 security advisory was published for a malicious version of the strong_password Ruby gem which allows for remote code execution in applications bundling the vulnerable dependency. 
We have already added the vulnerability to our database , and if your Ruby project is being monitored by Snyk, you will have already been notified by our routine alerts. If not, we strongly recommend you to te…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2019-13354`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2019-13354`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 2 use case(s) fired, 2 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.