# [MED] A Snyk peek into Node.js and npm’s state of open source security report 2019

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2019-10-09
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/a-snyk-peek-into-node-js-and-npms-state-of-open-source-security-report-2019/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Liran Tal 
October 9, 2019
0 mins read In the State of Open Source Security Report 2019, we set out to measure the pulse of the open source security landscape throughout the different language ecosystems and have analyzed responses from over five hundred open source maintainers and users who provided us with insights into their processes and knowledge of open source security risks as well as the skill level of the average maintainer.
In addition to gaining in…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — A Snyk peek into Node.js and npm’s state of open source security report 2019

`UC_3165_0` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — A Snyk peek into Node.js and npm’s state of open source security report 2019 ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("node.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — A Snyk peek into Node.js and npm’s state of open source security report 2019
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **MED** based on: 1 use case(s) fired, 1 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.