# [CRIT] Regular Expression Denial-of-Service in websocket-extensions

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2020-06-22
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/regular-expression-denial-of-service-in-websocket-extensions/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog Written by Alyssa Miller 
June 22, 2020
0 mins read Welcome to the newest Snyk blog series! In this monthly series, Snyk looks back on the vulnerabilities discovered by or reported to our research team. We choose one noteworthy vulnerability from the past month and tell the story behind the discovery, research, and disclosure of the vulnerability. We highlight the researchers, developers, and users who are helping identify and remediate vulnerabilities across the open source community.…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2020-7662`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2020-7663`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Regular Expression Denial-of-Service in websocket-extensions

`UC_3033_1` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Regular Expression Denial-of-Service in websocket-extensions ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("node.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Regular Expression Denial-of-Service in websocket-extensions
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2020-7662`, `CVE-2020-7663`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 2 use case(s) fired, 2 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.