# [HIGH] Node.js security: lessons from the Node.js Security Working Group in triaging vulnerabilities

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2020-11-06
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/lessons-from-the-node-js-security-working-group/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Liran Tal 
November 6, 2020
0 mins read In a previous blog post, I talked about a security disclosure for Fastify Node.js framework to the Node.js Security working group on HackerOne. The disclosure was regarding a Server-side JavaScript code injection vulnerability, resulting in the final conclusion that determined the report to be of no security impact to the Fastify Node.js web application framework, or to its JSON schema validation component fast-json-str…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Node.js security: lessons from the Node.js Security Working Group in triaging vu

`UC_2961_0` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Node.js security: lessons from the Node.js Security Working Group in triaging vu ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("node.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Node.js security: lessons from the Node.js Security Working Group in triaging vu
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: 1 use case(s) fired, 1 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.