# [CRIT] The rising trend of malicious packages in open source ecosystems **Source:** Snyk **Published:** 2023-03-23 **Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/malicious-packages-open-source-ecosystems/ ## Threat Profile Snyk Blog In this article Written by Idan Digmi March 23, 2023 0 mins read Editor's note: March 5, 2025 The landscape of malicious open-source packages continues to evolve. In 2024, Snyk identified over 3,600 malicious packages, with npm (3,000+) and PyPI (600+) as the primary targets. So far in 2025, we've flagged more than 1,000 new cases, with JavaScript remaining the most affected ecosystem. Snyk is prioritizing the addition of malicious packages to its database that have active users and p… ## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only) - **IPv4 (defanged):** `3.72.6.53` ## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques - **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link - **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link - **T1059.001** — PowerShell - **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment - **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File - **T1059.005** — Visual Basic - **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution - **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain - **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol ## Kill chain phases observed _(none detected from narrative keywords)_ ## Recommended hunts ### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution `UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl ``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ``` | tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time from datamodel=Web where Web.action="allowed" by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url | join type=inner recipient [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-" by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | rex field=url "https?://(?[^/]+)" | rename recipient AS recipient] | join type=inner src [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe", "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe", "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe", "curl.exe","wget.exe") by Processes.dest, Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename dest AS src] | eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time | where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60 | table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject, clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd | sort - click_time ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql // Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s. // Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks // never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the // 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable. let LookbackDays = 7d; let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays) | where AccountName !endswith "$" | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough") | join kind=inner ( EmailEvents | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays) | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered" | where EmailDirection == "Inbound" | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp ) on NetworkMessageId | join kind=leftouter ( EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain ) on NetworkMessageId, Url | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, ActionType; // Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on // the recipient's device. DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays) | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe", "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe") | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe", "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe") | join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn | where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s) | project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp, DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime), DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress, Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName | order by ClickTime desc ``` ### Email attachment opened from external sender `UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl | tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.file_name!="-" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject | rename All_Email.recipient as user | join type=inner user [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process | rename Processes.user as user] ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql let LookbackDays = 7d; let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays) | where AccountName !endswith "$" | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress, AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256; DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays) | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe") | where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe", "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe") | join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256 ``` ### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process `UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl | tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where AccountName !endswith "$" | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe") | where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine ``` ### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children `UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl | tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where AccountName !endswith "$" | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe") | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine ``` ### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates) These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing. - **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High** - IP / domain IOC(s): `3.72.6.53` ## Why this matters Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 5 use case(s) fired, 9 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.