# [CRIT] Preventing insecure deserialization in Node.js

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2023-04-17
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/preventing-insecure-deserialization-node-js/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Benson Kuria Macharia 
April 17, 2023
0 mins read Editor's note: May 31, 2023 This post has been updated to show how Snyk Open Source and the Snyk VS Code extension can help you prevent insecure deserialization in your projects. 
Serialization is the process of converting a JavaScript object into a stream of sequential bytes to send over a network or save to a database. Serialization changes the original data format while preserving its state and properties, …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2017-5941`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2017-5954`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Preventing insecure deserialization in Node.js

`UC_1660_1` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Preventing insecure deserialization in Node.js ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.js","server.js","serialize.js","seralize.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("node.js","server.js","serialize.js","seralize.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Preventing insecure deserialization in Node.js
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js", "server.js", "serialize.js", "seralize.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js", "server.js", "serialize.js", "seralize.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2017-5941`, `CVE-2017-5954`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 2 use case(s) fired, 2 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.