# [CRIT] Weak Hash vulnerability discovered in crypto-js and crypto-es (CVE-2023-46233 & CVE-2023-46133)

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2023-10-25
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/weak-hash-vulnerability-crypto-js-crypto-es/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Jamie Smith 
October 25, 2023
0 mins read On October 18, security researcher Zemnmez began the process of responsibly disclosing a "Use of Weak Hash" vulnerability that they found in crypto-js , an open source JavaScript library of crypto standards, for which maintenance has been discontinued. The vulnerability also impacts the crypto-es package (for ES6 and TypeScript), and the researcher has opened a similar issue requesting that the maintainers enable priv…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2023-46233`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2023-46133`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1552.001** — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- **T1110.002** — Brute Force: Password Cracking

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Assets running vulnerable crypto-js (<4.2.0) or crypto-es (<2.1.0) — CVE-2023-46233 / CVE-2023-46133

`UC_1349_2` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where (Vulnerabilities.signature IN ("CVE-2023-46233","CVE-2023-46133") OR Vulnerabilities.cve IN ("CVE-2023-46233","CVE-2023-46133")) by Vulnerabilities.dest Vulnerabilities.signature Vulnerabilities.severity Vulnerabilities.category Vulnerabilities.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)`
| eval package=case(signature=="CVE-2023-46233","crypto-js (<4.2.0)", signature=="CVE-2023-46133","crypto-es (<2.1.0)", true(),"unknown")
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| where CveId in ("CVE-2023-46233", "CVE-2023-46133")
| where SoftwareName has_any ("crypto-js", "crypto-es")
| extend FixedVersion = iff(CveId == "CVE-2023-46233", "4.2.0", "2.1.0")
| join kind=leftouter (DeviceInfo | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceCategory, OSPlatform, PublicIP, LoggedOnUsers) by DeviceId) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, DeviceId, OSPlatform, SoftwareVendor, SoftwareName, InstalledVersion=SoftwareVersion, CveId, FixedVersion, VulnerabilitySeverityLevel, RecommendedSecurityUpdate, LoggedOnUsers
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Weak Hash vulnerability discovered in crypto-js and crypto-es (CVE-2023-46233 &

`UC_1349_1` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Weak Hash vulnerability discovered in crypto-js and crypto-es (CVE-2023-46233 & ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("node.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Weak Hash vulnerability discovered in crypto-js and crypto-es (CVE-2023-46233 &
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2023-46233`, `CVE-2023-46133`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 3 use case(s) fired, 4 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.