# [HIGH] Snyk AppRisk Pro: A holistic approach to application risk management

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2024-05-01
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/empower-application-risk-management-with-snyk-apprisk/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Daniel Berman 
May 1, 2024
0 mins read We're thrilled to announce the availability of Snyk AppRisk Pro — our latest application security posture management (ASPM) offering designed to help enterprises manage and scale their application security programs with Snyk ! 
Snyk AppRisk Pro ships with a range of innovative, ecosystem-driven capabilities alongside new analytics tools, providing comprehensive application risk management with Snyk. These capabilities am…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: 1 use case(s) fired, 3 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.