# [MED] Finding and fixing exposed hardcoded secrets in your GitHub project with Snyk

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2024-06-25
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/fixing-exposed-hardcoded-secrets/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Chandler Mayo 
June 25, 2024
0 mins read Snyk is an excellent tool for spotting project vulnerabilities, including hardcoded secrets. In this blog, we'll show how you can use Snyk to locate hardcoded secrets and credentials and then refactor our code to use Doppler to store those secrets instead. We'll use the open source Snyk goof project as a reference Node.js boilerplate application, so feel free to follow along with us.
Getting started with the Snyk goof …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Finding and fixing exposed hardcoded secrets in your GitHub project with Snyk

`UC_1222_0` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Finding and fixing exposed hardcoded secrets in your GitHub project with Snyk ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.js","app.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("node.js","app.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Finding and fixing exposed hardcoded secrets in your GitHub project with Snyk
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js", "app.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js", "app.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **MED** based on: 1 use case(s) fired, 1 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.