# [HIGH] Identifying insecure C Code with Valgrind and fixing with Snyk Code

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2024-09-24
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/identifying-insecure-c-code-valgrind/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Liran Tal 
September 24, 2024
0 mins read C and C++ remain foundational in critical software development. These languages power a wide array of systems, from embedded devices to high-performance applications in manufacturing, operational technology (OT), and the industrial market. Their efficiency, control over system resources, and performance make them indispensable for developers working on mission-critical projects.
C and C++ are particularly prevalent in…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Identifying insecure C Code with Valgrind and fixing with Snyk Code

`UC_1137_0` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Identifying insecure C Code with Valgrind and fixing with Snyk Code ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-arm64-linux.so*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/program1*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/passwd*")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Identifying insecure C Code with Valgrind and fixing with Snyk Code
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-arm64-linux.so", "/tmp/program1", "/etc/passwd"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: 1 use case(s) fired, 1 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.