# [HIGH] Lottie Player npm package compromised for crypto wallet theft

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2024-10-31
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/lottie-player-npm-package-compromised-crypto-wallet-theft/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Liran Tal 
October 31, 2024
0 mins read On October 31st, 2024, another package compromise and cryptocurrency hijack story unfolded for a popular npm package.
The TL;DR for Lottie Player npm package compromise The popular npm library @lottiefiles/lottie-player was found to contain malicious code that prompts for connecting to users' crypto wallets.
The malicious code was added to npm releases 2.0.5, 2.0.6, and 2.0.7 after an npm registry account token used for…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1059** — Command and Scripting Interpreter

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Browser/proxy fetch of compromised @lottiefiles/lottie-player from unpkg or jsDelivr CDN

`UC_1096_4` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web.Web where (Web.url="*@lottiefiles/lottie-player@2.0.5*" OR Web.url="*@lottiefiles/lottie-player@2.0.6*" OR Web.url="*@lottiefiles/lottie-player@2.0.7*" OR Web.url="*@lottiefiles/lottie-player@latest*") AND (Web.dest="unpkg.com" OR Web.dest="*cdn.jsdelivr.net" OR Web.dest="*jsdelivr.net") by Web.src Web.dest Web.user Web.url Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| where RemoteUrl has "@lottiefiles/lottie-player"
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("@lottiefiles/lottie-player@2.0.5", "@lottiefiles/lottie-player@2.0.6", "@lottiefiles/lottie-player@2.0.7", "@lottiefiles/lottie-player@latest")
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("unpkg.com", "cdn.jsdelivr.net", "jsdelivr.net")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### npm/yarn/pnpm install of compromised @lottiefiles/lottie-player versions 2.0.5-2.0.7

`UC_1096_5` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("npm.exe","npm.cmd","yarn.exe","yarn.cmd","pnpm.exe","pnpm.cmd","node.exe") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("npm.exe","npm.cmd","yarn.exe","yarn.cmd","pnpm.exe","pnpm.cmd")) AND Processes.process="*@lottiefiles/lottie-player*" AND (Processes.process="*@2.0.5*" OR Processes.process="*@2.0.6*" OR Processes.process="*@2.0.7*" OR Processes.process="*@latest*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("npm.exe","npm.cmd","yarn.exe","yarn.cmd","pnpm.exe","pnpm.cmd","node.exe"))
    or (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("npm.exe","npm.cmd","yarn.exe","yarn.cmd","pnpm.exe","pnpm.cmd"))
| where ProcessCommandLine has "@lottiefiles/lottie-player"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("@2.0.5","@2.0.6","@2.0.7","@latest")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Crypto-wallet file/keystore access by non-wallet process

`UC_CRYPTO_WALLET` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Ethereum\keystore\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Bitcoin\wallet.dat"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Exodus\exodus.wallet*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Electrum\wallets\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\MetaMask\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Phantom\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Atomic\Local Storage\*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Ethereum\keystore\", @"\Bitcoin\", @"\Exodus\", @"\Electrum\wallets\", @"\MetaMask\", @"\Phantom\", @"\Atomic\Local Storage\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Lottie Player npm package compromised for crypto wallet theft

`UC_1096_3` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Lottie Player npm package compromised for crypto wallet theft ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("player.js","player.min.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("player.js","player.min.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Lottie Player npm package compromised for crypto wallet theft
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("player.js", "player.min.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("player.js", "player.min.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: 6 use case(s) fired, 7 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.