# [CRIT] Do not pass GO - Malicious Package Alert

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2025-02-12
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/go-malicious-package-alert/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Vandana Verma Sehgal 
February 12, 2025
0 mins read Researchers recently found another Software Supply Chain issue in BoltDB, a popular database tool in the Go programming environment. The BoltDB Go Module was found backdoored and contained hidden malicious code. This version took advantage of how Go manages and caches its modules, allowing it to go unnoticed for several years. This backdoor allows hackers to remotely control infected computers through a serv…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `GO-2025-3451`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `49.12.198.231`
- **Domain (defanged):** `github.com/boltdb-go/bolt`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1571** — Non-Standard Port
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059** — Command and Scripting Interpreter

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### BoltDB Go backdoor C2 callback to 49.12.198.231:20022

`UC_1000_4` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.process) as process from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_ip="49.12.198.231" AND All_Traffic.dest_port=20022 by All_Traffic.src host All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(90d)
| where RemoteIP == "49.12.198.231" and RemotePort == 20022
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Protocol, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Go typosquat module reference: github.com/boltdb-go/bolt in process or build telemetry

`UC_1000_5` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*boltdb-go/bolt*" OR Processes.process="*boltdb-go%2Fbolt*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(180d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "boltdb-go/bolt" or ProcessCommandLine has "boltdb-go%2Fbolt" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "boltdb-go/bolt"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `49.12.198.231`, `github.com/boltdb-go/bolt`

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `GO-2025-3451`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 6 use case(s) fired, 9 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.