# [HIGH] npm Supply Chain Attack via Open Source maintainer compromise

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2025-09-08
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/npm-supply-chain-attack-via-open-source-maintainer-compromise/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Brian Clark 
September 8, 2025
0 mins read On Monday, September 8th, a highly regarded open source developer, ~qix, was compromised via a phishing email. ~qix is an author and maintainer behind a large number of popular npm packages and found himself caught by this attack after responding to a message from the email address of support [at] npmjs [dot] help. 
This resulted in the attacker taking over his npm account and having access to publish malicious versi…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `npmjs.help`
- **Domain (defanged):** `websocket-api2.publicvm.com`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1566.002** — Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- **T1656** — Impersonation
- **T1056.003** — Input Capture: Web Portal Capture
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1567** — Exfiltration Over Web Service
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Inbound phishing email from npmjs.help maintainer-takeover domain

`UC_794_9` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Email.subject) as subject values(Email.recipient) as recipient values(Email.url) as url from datamodel=Email where (Email.sender_domain="npmjs.help" OR Email.url="*npmjs.help*" OR Email.message_body="*npmjs.help*") by Email.src_user Email.recipient_domain | `drop_dm_object_name(Email)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let lookback = 90d;
let badDomain = "npmjs.help";
let urls = EmailUrlInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
    | where UrlDomain endswith badDomain or Url has badDomain
    | project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain;
let senders = EmailEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
    | where SenderFromDomain endswith badDomain
         or SenderMailFromDomain endswith badDomain
         or SenderFromAddress has "@npmjs.help"
    | project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation;
senders
| union (urls | join kind=inner (EmailEvents | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)) on NetworkMessageId
         | project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation, Url, UrlDomain)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Browser/HTTPS traffic to npmjs.help credential-harvesting page

`UC_794_10` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Web.url) as url values(Web.user) as user values(Web.dest) as dest from datamodel=Web where (Web.url="*npmjs.help*" OR Web.site="npmjs.help" OR Web.url="*static-mw-host.b-cdn.net*" OR Web.url="*img-data-backup.b-cdn.net*") by Web.src host | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let badHosts = dynamic(["npmjs.help","static-mw-host.b-cdn.net","img-data-backup.b-cdn.net"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(90d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (badHosts)
      or tostring(parse_url(RemoteUrl).Host) in~ (badHosts)
      or RemoteIP == "185.7.81.108"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Egress to websocket-api2.publicvm.com (Qix campaign credential exfil C2)

`UC_794_11` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.src) as src values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(All_Traffic.app) as app from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest="websocket-api2.publicvm.com" OR All_Traffic.dest_host="websocket-api2.publicvm.com") by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | append [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query="websocket-api2.publicvm.com" OR DNS.query="*.publicvm.com" by DNS.src DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(180d)
| where RemoteUrl has "websocket-api2.publicvm.com"
     or tostring(parse_url(RemoteUrl).Host) =~ "websocket-api2.publicvm.com"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, Protocol
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Install / lockfile mention of the 28 compromised Qix-campaign package@versions

`UC_794_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("npm.exe","npm-cli.js","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","node.exe") AND (Processes.process="*debug@4.4.2*" OR Processes.process="*chalk@5.6.1*" OR Processes.process="*ansi-styles@6.2.2*" OR Processes.process="*ansi-regex@6.2.1*" OR Processes.process="*strip-ansi@7.1.1*" OR Processes.process="*color-convert@3.1.1*" OR Processes.process="*color-name@2.0.1*" OR Processes.process="*color@5.0.1*" OR Processes.process="*color-string@2.1.1*" OR Processes.process="*is-arrayish@0.3.3*" OR Processes.process="*slice-ansi@7.1.1*" OR Processes.process="*simple-swizzle@0.2.3*" OR Processes.process="*supports-color@10.2.1*" OR Processes.process="*supports-hyperlinks@4.1.1*" OR Processes.process="*chalk-template@1.1.1*" OR Processes.process="*backslash@0.2.1*" OR Processes.process="*wrap-ansi@9.0.1*" OR Processes.process="*has-ansi@6.0.1*" OR Processes.process="*error-ex@1.3.3*" OR Processes.process="*duckdb@1.3.3*" OR Processes.process="*@duckdb/node-api@1.3.3*" OR Processes.process="*@duckdb/node-bindings@1.3.3*" OR Processes.process="*@duckdb/duckdb-wasm@1.29.2*" OR Processes.process="*prebid.js@10.9.2*" OR Processes.process="*proto-tinker-wc@0.1.87*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let badPkgs = dynamic([
    "debug@4.4.2","chalk@5.6.1","ansi-styles@6.2.2","ansi-regex@6.2.1","strip-ansi@7.1.1",
    "color-convert@3.1.1","color-name@2.0.1","color@5.0.1","color-string@2.1.1",
    "is-arrayish@0.3.3","slice-ansi@7.1.1","simple-swizzle@0.2.3",
    "supports-color@10.2.1","supports-hyperlinks@4.1.1","chalk-template@1.1.1",
    "backslash@0.2.1","wrap-ansi@9.0.1","has-ansi@6.0.1","error-ex@1.3.3",
    "duckdb@1.3.3","@duckdb/node-api@1.3.3","@duckdb/node-bindings@1.3.3",
    "@duckdb/duckdb-wasm@1.29.2","prebid.js@10.9.2","proto-tinker-wc@0.1.87"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(90d)
| where FileName in~ ("npm.exe","npm-cli.js","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","node.exe","npm","yarn","pnpm")
     or InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("npm.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (badPkgs)
     or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (badPkgs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountUpn, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Crypto-wallet file/keystore access by non-wallet process

`UC_CRYPTO_WALLET` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Ethereum\keystore\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Bitcoin\wallet.dat"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Exodus\exodus.wallet*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Electrum\wallets\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\MetaMask\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Phantom\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Atomic\Local Storage\*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Ethereum\keystore\", @"\Bitcoin\", @"\Exodus\", @"\Electrum\wallets\", @"\MetaMask\", @"\Phantom\", @"\Atomic\Local Storage\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — npm Supply Chain Attack via Open Source maintainer compromise

`UC_794_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — npm Supply Chain Attack via Open Source maintainer compromise ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("prebid.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("prebid.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — npm Supply Chain Attack via Open Source maintainer compromise
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("prebid.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("prebid.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `npmjs.help`, `websocket-api2.publicvm.com`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 13 use case(s) fired, 20 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.