# [HIGH] ServiceNow's Virtual Agent Vulnerability Shows Why AI Security Needs Traditional AppSec Foundations

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2026-01-14
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/servicenow-virtual-agent-vulnerability/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Stephen Thoemmes 
January 14, 2026
0 mins read The recent disclosure of what security researchers are calling "the most severe AI-driven vulnerability uncovered to date" in ServiceNow's platform serves as a stark reminder: securing agentic AI isn't just about new AI-specific controls; it requires getting the fundamentals right first.
The anatomy of the virtual agent vulnerability In October 2025, AppOmni's security research team discovered a critical vulnerab…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2025-12420`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1078.001** — Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
- **T1078.004** — Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- **T1136.003** — Create Account: Cloud Account

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### BodySnatcher (CVE-2025-12420) — Hardcoded 'servicenowexternalagent' Token Observed in HTTP Traffic

`UC_624_4` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Web.url) as url values(Web.src) as src_ip values(Web.http_user_agent) as user_agent from datamodel=Web.Web where (Web.url="*servicenowexternalagent*" OR Web.http_referrer="*servicenowexternalagent*" OR Web.cookie="*servicenowexternalagent*" OR Web.http_user_agent="*servicenowexternalagent*") by Web.dest Web.action Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | where action!="blocked" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Hunt the hardcoded 'servicenowexternalagent' token across any HTTP context Defender sees (URL clicks, network events with URL captured).
let IOCToken = "servicenowexternalagent";
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has IOCToken or AdditionalFields has IOCToken
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| union (UrlClickEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where Url has IOCToken | project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, NetworkMessageId, IPAddress)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### ServiceNow Virtual Agent Invocation of Hidden AIA-Agent Invoker AutoChat Topic (CVE-2025-12420)

`UC_624_5` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Web.src) as src_ip values(Web.http_user_agent) as user_agent values(Web.http_method) as method from datamodel=Web.Web where Web.url="*service-now.com*" AND (Web.url="*/api/now/v1/awa*" OR Web.url="*/api/now/cs/*" OR Web.url="*virtualagent*" OR Web.url="*/api/sn_va_as_service/*") AND (Web.http_content="*Record Management*" OR Web.http_content="*AIA-Agent Invoker*" OR Web.http_content="*sys_user*" OR Web.url="*servicenowexternalagent*") by Web.dest Web.action Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | where status=200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Detect outbound calls from any device to ServiceNow tenants invoking the Virtual Agent / AutoChat API while carrying Record-Management agent indicators (CVE-2025-12420 BodySnatcher).
let SnowHost = "service-now.com";
let ChatAPI = dynamic(["/api/now/v1/awa", "/api/now/cs/", "/api/sn_va_as_service", "virtualagent", "openframe"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has SnowHost
| where RemoteUrl has_any (ChatAPI)
| where AdditionalFields has_any ("Record Management", "AIA-Agent Invoker", "servicenowexternalagent", "sys_user")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, AdditionalFields
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2025-12420`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: CVE present, 6 use case(s) fired, 9 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.