# [HIGH] G_Wagon: npm Package Deploys Python Stealer Targeting 100+ Crypto Wallets

**Source:** Aikido
**Published:** 2026-01-23
**Article:** https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-malware-g-wagon-python-stealer-crypto-wallets

## Threat Profile

Blog Vulnerabilities & Threats G_Wagon: npm Package Deploys Python Stealer Targeting 100+ Crypto Wallets G_Wagon: npm Package Deploys Python Stealer Targeting 100+ Crypto Wallets Written by Charlie Eriksen Published on: Jan 23, 2026 At 08:46 UTC on January 23rd, 2026, our malware detection system flagged a package called ansi-universal-ui . The name sounds like a boring UI component library. The description even says it's " a lightweight, modular UI component system for modern web applications. …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `nyc.cloud.appwrite.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `fra.cloud.appwrite.io`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.006** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1140** — Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1102.002** — Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
- **T1567.002** — Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- **T1132.001** — Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### G_Wagon npm postinstall spawns python with stdin pipe (fileless payload exec)

`UC_604_9` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="node.exe" Processes.process_name IN ("python.exe","pythonw.exe","python3.exe") (Processes.process="*python.exe\" -" OR Processes.process="*python.exe -" OR Processes.process="*pythonw.exe\" -" OR Processes.process="*python3.exe\" -") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where NOT match(process_path, "(?i)\\\\(Program Files|Python\\d+|Anaconda|Miniconda|conda)\\\\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "node.exe"
| where FileName matches regex @"(?i)^python(w|3)?\.exe$"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)python(w|3)?(\.exe)?""?\s+-\s*$"
| where FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files\Python"
   and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files (x86)\Python"
   and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Python"
   and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Windows"
   and FolderPath !contains @"\Anaconda"
   and FolderPath !contains @"\Miniconda"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessParentFileName, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### G_Wagon dropper: node.exe spawns system tar.exe extracting from stdin (-x -f - -C)

`UC_604_10` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="node.exe" Processes.process_name="tar.exe" Processes.process="*-x*" Processes.process="*-f*-*" Processes.process="*-C*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | regex process="(?i)\s-f\s+-\s+" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "node.exe"
| where FileName =~ "tar.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "-x" and ProcessCommandLine has "-C"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\s-f\s+-(\s|$)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### G_Wagon C2 beacon: node.exe or python.exe egress to Appwrite storage buckets

`UC_604_11` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.url) as urls values(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out values(All_Traffic.dest) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.app IN ("node.exe","python.exe","pythonw.exe","python3.exe") (All_Traffic.dest_host="nyc.cloud.appwrite.io" OR All_Traffic.dest_host="fra.cloud.appwrite.io" OR All_Traffic.url="*688625a0000f8a1b71e8*" OR All_Traffic.url="*6886229e003d46469fab*" OR All_Traffic.url="*69732d9c000042399d88*") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.app All_Traffic.dest_host | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","python.exe","pythonw.exe","python3.exe")
| where RemoteUrl has "cloud.appwrite.io"
   or RemoteUrl has "688625a0000f8a1b71e8"   // G_Wagon storage bucket
   or RemoteUrl has "6886229e003d46469fab"   // G_Wagon Appwrite project
   or RemoteUrl has "69732d9c000042399d88"   // G_Wagon payload file ID
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessParentFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Protocol
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### G_Wagon Python runtime drop into npm cache with lib_core/renderer or python_runtime paths

`UC_604_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as paths from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.process_name IN ("tar.exe","node.exe") (Filesystem.file_path="*\\lib_core\\renderer\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\python_runtime\\*" OR Filesystem.file_name="latest_script.py") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed","FileModified")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("tar.exe","node.exe")
| where FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)\\(lib_core\\renderer|python_runtime)\\"
   or FileName =~ "latest_script.py"
   or (FileName matches regex @"(?i)^python(w|3)?\.exe$"
        and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files"
        and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Python"
        and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Windows"
        and FolderPath !contains @"\Anaconda"
        and FolderPath !contains @"\Miniconda")
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp),
            FileCount=count(), SampleFiles=make_set(FileName, 20),
            SampleFolder=any(FolderPath)
            by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
               InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by FirstSeen desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Crypto-wallet file/keystore access by non-wallet process

`UC_CRYPTO_WALLET` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Ethereum\keystore\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Bitcoin\wallet.dat"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Exodus\exodus.wallet*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Electrum\wallets\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\MetaMask\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Phantom\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Atomic\Local Storage\*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Ethereum\keystore\", @"\Bitcoin\", @"\Exodus\", @"\Electrum\wallets\", @"\MetaMask\", @"\Phantom\", @"\Atomic\Local Storage\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — G_Wagon: npm Package Deploys Python Stealer Targeting 100+ Crypto Wallets

`UC_604_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — G_Wagon: npm Package Deploys Python Stealer Targeting 100+ Crypto Wallets ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("latest_script.py","index.js") OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("latest_script.py","index.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — G_Wagon: npm Package Deploys Python Stealer Targeting 100+ Crypto Wallets
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("latest_script.py", "index.js") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("DownloadString"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("latest_script.py", "index.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `nyc.cloud.appwrite.io`, `fra.cloud.appwrite.io`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 13 use case(s) fired, 22 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.