# [CRIT] PlugX Meeting Invitation via MSBuild and GDATA

**Source:** Lab52
**Published:** 2026-02-26
**Article:** https://lab52.io/blog/plugx-meeting-invitation-via-msbuild-and-gdata/

## Threat Profile

In relation to the latest variant of the PlugX RAT executed by STATICPLUGIN analyzed by IIJ-SECT , LAB52 aims to complement this information with additional observed deployment activity and encryption characteristics in samples analyzed by this team.
PlugX 
PlugX is a long-running Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that has been consistently linked to multiple China-aligned threat actors and espionage operations worldwide. Since its public identification around 2008, it has been attributed to groups suc…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `decoraat.net`
- **Domain (defanged):** `decoorat.net`
- **Domain (defanged):** `onedown.gesecole.net`
- **Domain (defanged):** `onedow.gesecole.net`
- **Domain (defanged):** `gesecole.net`
- **SHA256:** `e7ed0cd4115f3ff35c38d36cc50c6a13eba2d845554439a36108789cd1e05b17`
- **SHA256:** `46314092c8d00ab93cbbdc824b9fc39dec9303169163b9625bae3b1717d70ebc`
- **SHA256:** `8421e7995778faf1f2a902fb2c51d85ae39481f443b7b3186068d5c33c472d99`
- **SHA256:** `29cd44aa2a51a200d82cca578d97dc13241bc906ea6a33b132c6ca567dc8f3ad`
- **SHA256:** `de8ddc2451fb1305d76ab20661725d11c77625aeeaa1447faf3fbf56706c87f1`
- **SHA256:** `5f9af68db10b029453264cfc9b8eee4265549a2855bb79668ccfc571fb11f5fc`
- **SHA256:** `d293ded5a63679b81556d2c622c78be6253f500b6751d4eeb271e6500a23b21e`
- **SHA256:** `6df8649bf4e233ee86a896ee8e5a3b3179c168ef927ac9283b945186f8629ee7`
- **SHA1:** `1151100a0aa1ed88f7897709444fd3b3b1044c10`
- **SHA1:** `2336c9a20ecd53ec1be468282bae94c8160eb93a`
- **SHA1:** `ad833604d230b241e180950980ea462b3812f82a`
- **SHA1:** `d1a86ed06b18efef5ce724d2129cf1583b779b44`
- **SHA1:** `f06da8e29c3f0fafabfc3a524ae8b21730b57ed3`
- **MD5:** `381247c1d4c68a406237d7d3aa030930`
- **MD5:** `769687f93869a70511aac1ef7c752455`
- **MD5:** `7a75e713db41c28378e823322fdea0fd`
- **MD5:** `9f331a11a054f33664fe86543fc34cf0`
- **MD5:** `e7cb954f4bbdbadbd2c0206577621683`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1127.001** — Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild
- **T1574.002** — Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- **T1547.001** — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1573.002** — Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### PlugX phishing lure — 'Meeting Invitation' email linking to gesecole.net ZIP

`UC_503_8` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email.All_Email where (All_Email.subject="*Meeting Invitation*" OR All_Email.subject="*Invitation_Letter*") by All_Email.src_user All_Email.recipient All_Email.subject All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | join type=inner message_id [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.url IN ("*gesecole.net*","*onedown.gesecole.net*","*Invitation_Letter_No*.zip") by All_Email.message_id All_Email.url | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LureSubjects = dynamic(["Meeting Invitation","Invitation_Letter","Invitation Letter"]); let PlugxDomains = dynamic(["gesecole.net","onedown.gesecole.net"]); let LureMail = EmailEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where Subject has_any (LureSubjects); let LureUrls = EmailUrlInfo | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where Url has_any (PlugxDomains) or Url has "Invitation_Letter_No" or Url endswith ".zip"; LureMail | join kind=inner LureUrls on NetworkMessageId | project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, Url, UrlDomain, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation | order by Timestamp desc
```

### Renamed MSBuild.exe executing inline .csproj from user-writable path

`UC_503_9` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe) Processes.process="*.csproj*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process_path, "(?i)\\\\(Users|Downloads|Temp|AppData|Public|ProgramData)\\\\") OR match(process, "(?i)\\\\(Users|Downloads|Temp|AppData|Public)\\\\.*\\.csproj") OR match(process, "(?i)(Invitation|Letter|Meeting|Agenda).*\\.csproj") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where FileName =~ "msbuild.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "MSBuild.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName =~ "MSBuild.exe" | where ProcessCommandLine has ".csproj" | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\(Users|Downloads|Temp|AppData|Public|ProgramData)\\" or FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)\\(Users|Downloads|Temp|AppData|Public|ProgramData)\\" | where not(FolderPath has_any (@"\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\", @"\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\", @"\Program Files\dotnet\")) | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, SHA256 | order by Timestamp desc
```

### PlugX DLL side-load — G DATA Avk.exe running from C:\Users\Public\GDatas\

`UC_503_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=avk.exe OR Processes.original_file_name="AVK.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where NOT match(process_path, "(?i)\\\\Program Files( \\(x86\\))?\\\\G(\\s)?DATA\\\\") AND (match(process_path, "(?i)\\\\(Users\\\\Public|AppData|Temp|ProgramData|Downloads)\\\\") OR match(process, "(?i)\\s\\d{2,5}\\s\\d{2,5}\\s*$")) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where FileName =~ "avk.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "AVK.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName has "G DATA" | where not(FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\G\s?DATA\\") | where FolderPath has_any (@"\Users\Public\", @"\AppData\", @"\Temp\", @"\ProgramData\", @"\Downloads\") or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\Avk\.exe[\"']?\s+\d{2,5}\s+\d{2,5}\s*$" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName, ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256 | join kind=leftouter (DeviceImageLoadEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where FileName =~ "avk.dll" | project DeviceId, DllFolderPath = FolderPath, DllSHA256 = SHA256, DllInitiatingProcessId = InitiatingProcessId) on DeviceId | order by Timestamp desc
```

### PlugX persistence — Run key 'G DATA' pointing to C:\Users\Public\GDatas\Avk.exe

`UC_503_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run*" (Registry.registry_value_name="G DATA" OR Registry.registry_value_data="*\\Users\\Public\\GDatas\\Avk.exe*" OR Registry.registry_value_data="*GDatas\\Avk.exe*") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where ActionType in ("RegistryValueSet","RegistryKeyCreated") | where RegistryKey has @"\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" | where RegistryValueName =~ "G DATA" or RegistryValueData has @"\Users\Public\GDatas\Avk.exe" or RegistryValueData has @"GDatas\Avk.exe" or RegistryValueData matches regex @"(?i)Avk\.exe[\"']?\s+\d{2,5}\s+\d{2,5}" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName | order by Timestamp desc
```

### PlugX C2 egress — connections to decoraat.net / decoorat.net / gesecole.net

`UC_503_12` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where (DNS.query="*decoraat.net" OR DNS.query="*decoorat.net" OR DNS.query="*gesecole.net" OR DNS.query="*onedown.gesecole.net") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | append [| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest="decoraat.net" OR All_Traffic.dest="decoorat.net" OR All_Traffic.dest="gesecole.net" OR All_Traffic.dest="onedown.gesecole.net") All_Traffic.dest_port=443 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let PlugxDomains = dynamic(["decoraat.net","decoorat.net","gesecole.net","onedown.gesecole.net"]); DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where (isnotempty(RemoteUrl) and RemoteUrl has_any (PlugxDomains)) or (isnotempty(RemoteIP) and RemotePort == 443 and RemoteUrl has_any (PlugxDomains)) | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessSHA256, InitiatingProcessAccountName | order by Timestamp desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — PlugX Meeting Invitation via MSBuild and GDATA

`UC_503_7` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — PlugX Meeting Invitation via MSBuild and GDATA ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("avk.exe","avk.dll","invitation_letter_no.02_2026.exe","msbuild.exe","kernel32.dll","ntdll.dll","kernelbase.dll","winhttp.dll","ws2_32.dll") OR Processes.process_path="*C:\Users\Public\GDatas\Avk.exe*" OR Processes.process_path="*C:\Users\Public\GDatas*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*C:\Users\Public\GDatas\Avk.exe*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*C:\Users\Public\GDatas*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("avk.exe","avk.dll","invitation_letter_no.02_2026.exe","msbuild.exe","kernel32.dll","ntdll.dll","kernelbase.dll","winhttp.dll","ws2_32.dll"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — PlugX Meeting Invitation via MSBuild and GDATA
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("avk.exe", "avk.dll", "invitation_letter_no.02_2026.exe", "msbuild.exe", "kernel32.dll", "ntdll.dll", "kernelbase.dll", "winhttp.dll", "ws2_32.dll") or FolderPath has_any ("C:\Users\Public\GDatas\Avk.exe", "C:\Users\Public\GDatas"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("C:\Users\Public\GDatas\Avk.exe", "C:\Users\Public\GDatas") or FileName in~ ("avk.exe", "avk.dll", "invitation_letter_no.02_2026.exe", "msbuild.exe", "kernel32.dll", "ntdll.dll", "kernelbase.dll", "winhttp.dll", "ws2_32.dll"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `decoraat.net`, `decoorat.net`, `onedown.gesecole.net`, `onedow.gesecole.net`, `gesecole.net`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `e7ed0cd4115f3ff35c38d36cc50c6a13eba2d845554439a36108789cd1e05b17`, `46314092c8d00ab93cbbdc824b9fc39dec9303169163b9625bae3b1717d70ebc`, `8421e7995778faf1f2a902fb2c51d85ae39481f443b7b3186068d5c33c472d99`, `29cd44aa2a51a200d82cca578d97dc13241bc906ea6a33b132c6ca567dc8f3ad`, `de8ddc2451fb1305d76ab20661725d11c77625aeeaa1447faf3fbf56706c87f1`, `5f9af68db10b029453264cfc9b8eee4265549a2855bb79668ccfc571fb11f5fc`, `d293ded5a63679b81556d2c622c78be6253f500b6751d4eeb271e6500a23b21e`, `6df8649bf4e233ee86a896ee8e5a3b3179c168ef927ac9283b945186f8629ee7` _(+10 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 13 use case(s) fired, 17 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.