# [HIGH] Glassworm Strikes Popular React Native Phone Number Packages

**Source:** Aikido
**Published:** 2026-03-16
**Article:** https://www.aikido.dev/blog/glassworm-strikes-react-packages-phone-numbers

## Threat Profile

Blog Vulnerabilities & Threats Glassworm Strikes Popular React Native Phone Number Packages Glassworm Strikes Popular React Native Phone Number Packages Written by Raphael Silva Published on: Mar 16, 2026 Matching March 16, 2026, releases added obfuscated preinstall malware to packages from the same publisher 
On March 16, 2026, two React Native npm packages from the AstrOOnauta were backdoored in a coordinated supply chain attack. Both releases added an identical install-time loader that fetche…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `45.32.150.251`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `217.69.3.152`
- **SHA256:** `59221aa9623d86c930357dba7e3f54138c7ccbd0daa9c483d766cd8ce1b6ad26`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1053.005** — Scheduled Task
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1053.005** — Persistence (article-specific)
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1053.005** — Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- **T1547.001** — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Glassworm stage-2/stage-3 C2 callback to 45.32.150.251 or 217.69.3.152

`UC_466_10` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as ports values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest IN ("45.32.150.251","217.69.3.152") by All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | append [| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest IN ("45.32.150.251","217.69.3.152") OR match(Web.url,"(?i)get_arhive_npm|/wall$|3e4Tg8V") by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let GlassWormIPs = dynamic(["45.32.150.251","217.69.3.152"]);
let GlassWormUrlMarkers = dynamic(["get_arhive_npm","3e4Tg8V","/wall"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP in (GlassWormIPs)
   or (isnotempty(RemoteUrl) and RemoteUrl has_any (GlassWormUrlMarkers))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Glassworm stage-3 persistence: schtasks UpdateApp + HKCU Run DPKCbbQ

`UC_466_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="schtasks.exe" Processes.process="*UpdateApp*" Processes.process="*onstart*" Processes.process="*Bypass*" by Processes.dest, Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | append [ | tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" Registry.registry_value_name="DPKCbbQ" by Registry.dest, Registry.user, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` ] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let TaskPersistence = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "UpdateApp"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "onstart"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Bypass","-rl highest")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Indicator="schtasks_UpdateApp";
let RegPersistence = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("RegistryValueSet","RegistryKeyCreated")
| where RegistryKey has @"\CurrentVersion\Run"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "DPKCbbQ"
   or RegistryValueData has @"powershell" and RegistryValueData has "WindowStyle Hidden" and RegistryValueData has "Bypass"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName,
          RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Indicator="HKCU_Run_DPKCbbQ";
union TaskPersistence, RegPersistence
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Glassworm side-staged Node.js runtime under %APPDATA%\_node_x86 / _node_x64

`UC_466_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as paths values(Filesystem.process_name) as proc from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\_node_x86\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\_node_x64\\*" OR Filesystem.file_name="node-v22.9.0-win-x86.zip" OR Filesystem.file_name="node-v22.9.0-win-x64.zip") by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | append [| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Web where match(Web.url,"nodejs\.org/download/release/v22\.9\.0/node-v22\.9\.0-win-(x86|x64)\.zip") by Web.src, Web.user, Web.url, Web.user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let SideStageFolders = dynamic([@"\AppData\Roaming\_node_x86\", @"\AppData\Roaming\_node_x64\"]);
let NodeZips = dynamic(["node-v22.9.0-win-x86.zip","node-v22.9.0-win-x64.zip"]);
let FileSig = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed")
| where FolderPath has_any (SideStageFolders) or FileName in~ (NodeZips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessAccountName, Indicator="appdata_node_runtime";
let NetSig = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has "nodejs.org/download/release/v22.9.0/node-v22.9.0-win"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, Indicator="nodejs_zip_download_nonbrowser";
union FileSig, NetSig
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Crypto-wallet file/keystore access by non-wallet process

`UC_CRYPTO_WALLET` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Ethereum\keystore\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Bitcoin\wallet.dat"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Exodus\exodus.wallet*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Electrum\wallets\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\MetaMask\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Phantom\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Atomic\Local Storage\*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Ethereum\keystore\", @"\Bitcoin\", @"\Exodus\", @"\Electrum\wallets\", @"\MetaMask\", @"\Phantom\", @"\Atomic\Local Storage\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Scheduled task created with suspicious image / encoded args

`UC_SCHEDULED_TASK` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name="schtasks.exe" AND Processes.process="*/create*"
      AND (Processes.process="*powershell*" OR Processes.process="*cmd.exe*"
        OR Processes.process="*rundll32*" OR Processes.process="*-enc*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*\Users\Public*"
        OR Processes.process="*\AppData\*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("powershell","cmd.exe","rundll32","-enc","FromBase64","\Users\Public","\AppData\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Glassworm Strikes Popular React Native Phone Number Packages

`UC_466_9` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Glassworm Strikes Popular React Native Phone Number Packages ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("install.js","node.js") OR Processes.process="*-WindowStyle Hidden*" OR Processes.process_path="*\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("install.js","node.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Glassworm Strikes Popular React Native Phone Number Packages
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("install.js", "node.js") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-WindowStyle Hidden") or FolderPath has_any ("\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run") or FileName in~ ("install.js", "node.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `45.32.150.251`, `217.69.3.152`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `59221aa9623d86c930357dba7e3f54138c7ccbd0daa9c483d766cd8ce1b6ad26`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 13 use case(s) fired, 18 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.