# [CRIT] ForceMemo: Hundreds of GitHub Python Repos Compromised via Account Takeover and Force-Push

**Source:** StepSecurity
**Published:** 2026-03-26
**Article:** https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/forcememo-hundreds-of-github-python-repos-compromised-via-account-takeover-and-force-push

## Threat Profile

Back to Blog Threat Intel ForceMemo: Hundreds of GitHub Python Repos Compromised via Account Takeover and Force-Push The StepSecurity threat intelligence team was the first to discover and report on an ongoing campaign — which we are tracking as ForceMemo — in which an attacker is compromising hundreds of GitHub accounts and injecting identical malware into hundreds of Python repositories. The earliest injections date to March 8, 2026, and the campaign is still active with new repos continuing t…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `217.69.0.159`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.006** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1102.001** — Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### ForceMemo: Node.js v22.9.0 spawned by Python from user home directory

`UC_434_8` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_path) as process_path values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_command_line) as process_command_line values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("python.exe","python","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12","python3.13","pip","pip.exe","pip3") AND Processes.process_name IN ("node","node.exe") AND (Processes.process_path="*node-v22.9.0-*\\bin\\node*" OR Processes.process_path="*node-v22.9.0-*/bin/node*" OR Processes.process_path="*\\Users\\*\\node-v22.9.0-*" OR Processes.process_path="*/home/*/node-v22.9.0-*" OR Processes.process_path="*/Users/*/node-v22.9.0-*" OR Processes.process_path="*/root/node-v22.9.0-*") by host Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("python","python.exe","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12","python3.13","pip","pip.exe","pip3")
| where FileName in~ ("node","node.exe")
| where FolderPath has "node-v22.9.0"
| where FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)(\\Users\\[^\\]+\\node-v22\.9\.0-|/home/[^/]+/node-v22\.9\.0-|/Users/[^/]+/node-v22\.9\.0-|/root/node-v22\.9\.0-)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### ForceMemo: Python process queries Solana mainnet RPC endpoint (blockchain dead-drop C2)

`UC_434_9` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.query) as query values(DNS.answer) as resolved from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query IN ("api.mainnet-beta.solana.com","solana-mainnet.gateway.tatum.io","go.getblock.us","solana-rpc.publicnode.com","api.blockeden.xyz","solana.drpc.org","solana.leorpc.com","solana.api.onfinality.io","solana.api.pocket.network") by host DNS.src DNS.src_user | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | join type=inner host [| tstats summariesonly=t count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("python","python.exe","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12","python3.13","pip","pip.exe","pip3") by host Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process_command_line Processes._time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename _time as proc_time | where proc_time>=relative_time(now(),"-7d")] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let SolanaRpc = dynamic(["api.mainnet-beta.solana.com","solana-mainnet.gateway.tatum.io","go.getblock.us","solana-rpc.publicnode.com","api.blockeden.xyz","solana.drpc.org","solana.leorpc.com","solana.api.onfinality.io","solana.api.pocket.network"]);
union
  ( DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("python","python.exe","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12","python3.13","pip","pip.exe","pip3")
    | where RemoteUrl has_any (SolanaRpc)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Source="Network", InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName ),
  ( DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("python","python.exe","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12","python3.13","pip","pip.exe","pip3")
    | extend Query = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).QueryName)
    | where Query in~ (SolanaRpc)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Source="DNS", InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl=Query, RemoteIP, RemotePort=int(null), AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName )
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### ForceMemo: init.json persistence file or i.js loader dropped by Python in user home root

`UC_434_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action="created" AND Filesystem.file_name IN ("init.json","i.js") AND Filesystem.process_name IN ("python","python.exe","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12","python3.13","pip","pip.exe","pip3") AND (Filesystem.file_path="*\\Users\\*\\init.json" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\Users\\*\\i.js" OR Filesystem.file_path="/home/*/init.json" OR Filesystem.file_path="/home/*/i.js" OR Filesystem.file_path="/Users/*/init.json" OR Filesystem.file_path="/Users/*/i.js" OR Filesystem.file_path="/root/init.json" OR Filesystem.file_path="/root/i.js") by host Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("python","python.exe","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12","python3.13","pip","pip.exe","pip3")
| where FileName in~ ("init.json","i.js")
| where FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)^([A-Z]:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\?|/home/[^/]+/?|/Users/[^/]+/?|/root/?)$"
| where FolderPath !has "site-packages" and FolderPath !has "node_modules" and FolderPath !has ".venv" and FolderPath !has "venv"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Crypto-wallet file/keystore access by non-wallet process

`UC_CRYPTO_WALLET` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Ethereum\keystore\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Bitcoin\wallet.dat"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Exodus\exodus.wallet*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Electrum\wallets\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\MetaMask\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Phantom\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Atomic\Local Storage\*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Ethereum\keystore\", @"\Bitcoin\", @"\Exodus\", @"\Electrum\wallets\", @"\MetaMask\", @"\Phantom\", @"\Atomic\Local Storage\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — ForceMemo: Hundreds of GitHub Python Repos Compromised via Account Takeover and

`UC_434_7` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — ForceMemo: Hundreds of GitHub Python Repos Compromised via Account Takeover and ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("setup.py","main.py","app.py","node.js","manage.py","streamlit_app.py","run.py","config.py","cli.py","noxfile.py"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/home/runner/node-v22.9.0-linux-x64/bin/node*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("setup.py","main.py","app.py","node.js","manage.py","streamlit_app.py","run.py","config.py","cli.py","noxfile.py"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — ForceMemo: Hundreds of GitHub Python Repos Compromised via Account Takeover and
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("setup.py", "main.py", "app.py", "node.js", "manage.py", "streamlit_app.py", "run.py", "config.py", "cli.py", "noxfile.py"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/home/runner/node-v22.9.0-linux-x64/bin/node") or FileName in~ ("setup.py", "main.py", "app.py", "node.js", "manage.py", "streamlit_app.py", "run.py", "config.py", "cli.py", "noxfile.py"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `217.69.0.159`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 11 use case(s) fired, 17 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.