# [CRIT] litellm: Credential Stealer Hidden in PyPI Wheel

**Source:** StepSecurity
**Published:** 2026-03-28
**Article:** https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/litellm-credential-stealer-hidden-in-pypi-wheel

## Threat Profile

Back to Blog Threat Intel litellm: Credential Stealer Hidden in PyPI Wheel On March 24, 2026, a critical supply chain compromise was identified across two litellm releases on PyPI. The issue was disclosed in BerriAI/litellm#24512. Sai Likhith View LinkedIn March 24, 2026
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On March 24, 2026, a critical supply chain compromise was identified across two litellm releases on PyPI. The issue…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `models.litellm.cloud`
- **Domain (defanged):** `checkmarx.zone`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1543.003** — Windows Service
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1041** — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- **T1573.002** — Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1546** — Event Triggered Execution
- **T1059.006** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1140** — Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- **T1082** — System Information Discovery
- **T1033** — System Owner/User Discovery
- **T1016** — System Network Configuration Discovery
- **T1059.004** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- **T1552.005** — Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1552.001** — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- **T1613** — Container and Resource Discovery

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Outbound DNS/HTTPS to TeamPCP exfil domain models.litellm.cloud (litellm PyPI compromise)

`UC_423_11` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.user) as user values(All_Traffic.app) as process from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_host="models.litellm.cloud" OR All_Traffic.dest_host="*.litellm.cloud") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_host All_Traffic.dest_port
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| eval signal="TeamPCP_litellm_exfil_domain"
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 30d;
let ExfilDomains = dynamic(["models.litellm.cloud"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
  | where RemoteUrl has_any (ExfilDomains) or RemoteUrl endswith ".litellm.cloud"
  | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionType),
(DeviceEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
  | where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
  | where RemoteUrl has_any (ExfilDomains) or AdditionalFields has "models.litellm.cloud"
  | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, AdditionalFields, ActionType)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Malicious litellm_init.pth dropped to site-packages by pip (litellm==1.82.8 install artifact)

`UC_423_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="litellm_init.pth" OR (Filesystem.file_path="*site-packages*" Filesystem.file_name="litellm_init.pth") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| eval signal="TeamPCP_litellm_pth_dropper"
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where FileName =~ "litellm_init.pth"
   or (FolderPath has "site-packages" and FileName endswith ".pth" and SHA256 == "ceNa7wMJnNHy1kRnNCcwJaFjWX3pORLfMh7xGL8TUjg")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, FileSize, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Python spawning python -c with base64.b64decode exec (litellm .pth stage-1 launcher)

`UC_423_13` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_hash) as hashes from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("python.exe","python","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12") Processes.process_name IN ("python.exe","python","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12") (Processes.process="*base64.b64decode*" Processes.process="*exec(*" Processes.process="* -c *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName matches regex @"(?i)^python\d*(\.exe)?$"
| where FileName matches regex @"(?i)^python\d*(\.exe)?$"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "-c"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "base64.b64decode"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("exec(","exec (")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Python process spawning shell with TeamPCP recon chain (hostname; whoami; uname; ip addr fallback)

`UC_423_14` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmdlines from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("python.exe","python","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12") Processes.process_name IN ("sh","bash","dash","zsh","cmd.exe") (Processes.process="*hostname*" Processes.process="*whoami*" Processes.process="*uname -a*") OR (Processes.process="*ip addr 2>/dev/null*" Processes.process="*ifconfig*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName matches regex @"(?i)^python\d*(\.exe)?$"
| where FileName in~ ("sh","bash","dash","zsh","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh")
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "hostname" and ProcessCommandLine has "whoami" and ProcessCommandLine has "uname")
    or ProcessCommandLine has "ip addr 2>/dev/null || ifconfig"
    or (ProcessCommandLine has "hostname" and ProcessCommandLine has "printenv" and ProcessCommandLine has "ip route")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Python process contacting AWS IMDS 169.254.169.254 (litellm stealer IAM credential theft)

`UC_423_15` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.user) as user from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest="169.254.169.254" All_Traffic.app IN ("python.exe","python","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| eval signal="TeamPCP_litellm_IMDS_theft"
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP == "169.254.169.254"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName matches regex @"(?i)^python\d*(\.exe)?$"
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, LocalIP
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### In-cluster Kubernetes secret enumeration with Python user-agent (litellm stealer K8s pivot)

`UC_423_16` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.process_name) as procs from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token" Filesystem.process_name IN ("python","python3","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.action
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FolderPath startswith "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount"
   or FileName == "token" and FolderPath has "kubernetes.io/serviceaccount"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName matches regex @"(?i)^python\d*$"
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Crypto-wallet file/keystore access by non-wallet process

`UC_CRYPTO_WALLET` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Ethereum\keystore\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Bitcoin\wallet.dat"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Exodus\exodus.wallet*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Electrum\wallets\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\MetaMask\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Phantom\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Atomic\Local Storage\*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Ethereum\keystore\", @"\Bitcoin\", @"\Exodus\", @"\Electrum\wallets\", @"\MetaMask\", @"\Phantom\", @"\Atomic\Local Storage\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Service install for persistence — sc.exe / new service registry write

`UC_SERVICE_PERSIST` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name="sc.exe" AND Processes.process="*create*"
      AND (Processes.process="*\Users\*" OR Processes.process="*\AppData\*"
        OR Processes.process="*\ProgramData\*" OR Processes.process="*\Temp\*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| append
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
        where Registry.registry_path="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\*"
          AND Registry.registry_value_name="ImagePath"
          AND (Registry.registry_value_data="*\Users\*"
            OR Registry.registry_value_data="*\AppData\*"
            OR Registry.registry_value_data="*\Temp\*")
        by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName =~ "sc.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "create"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(\Users\|\AppData\|\ProgramData\|\Temp\)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — litellm: Credential Stealer Hidden in PyPI Wheel

`UC_423_10` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — litellm: Credential Stealer Hidden in PyPI Wheel ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("setup.py","proxy_server.py","mongorc.js","sysmon.py"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/dev/null*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/kubernetes/admin.conf*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/root/.docker/config.json*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/environment*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/var/www*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/ssl/private/*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("setup.py","proxy_server.py","mongorc.js","sysmon.py"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — litellm: Credential Stealer Hidden in PyPI Wheel
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("setup.py", "proxy_server.py", "mongorc.js", "sysmon.py"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/dev/null", "/etc/ssh/ssh_host_", "/etc/kubernetes/admin.conf", "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token", "/root/.docker/config.json", "/etc/environment", "/var/www", "/etc/ssl/private/") or FileName in~ ("setup.py", "proxy_server.py", "mongorc.js", "sysmon.py"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `models.litellm.cloud`, `checkmarx.zone`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 17 use case(s) fired, 32 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.