# [HIGH] Securing Vibe Coding and AI Coding Agents: An End-to-End Approach with StepSecurity

**Source:** StepSecurity
**Published:** 2026-04-12
**Article:** https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/securing-vibe-coding-and-ai-coding-agents-an-end-to-end-approach-with-stepsecurity

## Threat Profile

Back to Blog Product Introducing StepSecurity Dev Machine Guard: Protecting Developer Machines from Supply Chain Attacks Modern supply chain attacks target developer machines and AI coding agents. Learn how StepSecurity Dev Machine Guard stops credential theft early Ashish Kurmi View LinkedIn January 13, 2026
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Developer machines hold your most sensitive credentials such as GitHub crede…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `metrics-trustwallet.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `api.metrics-trustwallet.com`
- **SHA256:** `46faab8ab153fae6e80e7cca38eab363075bb524edd79e42269217a083628f09`
- **SHA256:** `b74caeaa75e077c99f7d44f46daaf9796a3be43ecf24f2a1fd381844669da777`
- **SHA256:** `dc67467a39b70d1cd4c1f7f7a459b35058163592f4a9e8fb4dffcbba98ef210c`
- **SHA256:** `4b2399646573bb737c4969563303d8ee2e9ddbd1b271f1ca9e35ea78062538db`
- **SHA256:** `62ee164b9b306250c1172583f138c9614139264f889fa99614903c12755468d0`
- **SHA256:** `f099c5d9ec417d4445a0328ac0ada9cde79fc37410914103ae9c609cbc0ee068`
- **SHA256:** `cbb9bc5a8496243e02f3cc080efbe3e4a1430ba0671f2e43a202bf45b05479cd`
- **SHA256:** `a3894003ad1d293ba96d77881ccd2071446dc3f65f434669b49b3da92421901a`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1041** — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1546.016** — Event Triggered Execution: Installer Packages
- **T1567** — Exfiltration Over Web Service
- **T1078.004** — Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- **T1552.001** — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Trust Wallet Shai-Hulud C2 callback to metrics-trustwallet.com / 138.124.70.40

`UC_395_7` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query IN ("metrics-trustwallet.com","api.metrics-trustwallet.com","*.metrics-trustwallet.com") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer host
| `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`
| append 
   [| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest IN ("138.124.70.40") AND All_Traffic.dest_port IN (80,443) by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app
   | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`]
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let badDomains = dynamic(["metrics-trustwallet.com","api.metrics-trustwallet.com"]);
let badIPs = dynamic(["138.124.70.40"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (badDomains) or RemoteIP in (badIPs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Shai-Hulud 2.0 npm worm artifact: setup_bun.js / bun_environment.js dropped by node/npm

`UC_395_8` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as paths values(Filesystem.process_name) as writers from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("setup_bun.js","bun_environment.js") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| where match(writers, "(?i)(node|npm|yarn|pnpm|bun)\\.(exe|cmd)?") OR match(paths, "(?i)node_modules|npm-cache|\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\npm")
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where FileName in~ ("setup_bun.js","bun_environment.js")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","yarn.exe","yarn.cmd","pnpm.exe","pnpm.cmd","bun.exe","sh.exe","bash.exe")
   or FolderPath has_any (@"\node_modules\",@"\.npm\",@"\AppData\Local\npm\",@"\AppData\Roaming\npm\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, FileSize
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Shai-Hulud preinstall: node/npm spawning git/curl/gh pushing to attacker repo or GitHub API

`UC_395_9` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmds from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("node.exe","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","bun.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("git.exe","curl.exe","gh.exe","node.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| where match(cmds, "(?i)(api\\.github\\.com|/user/repos|Sha1-Hulud|Shai-Hulud|--detach|bun_environment|setup_bun|aws/credentials|\\.npmrc|id_rsa|/.ssh/)")
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let pkgMgrs = dynamic(["node.exe","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","yarn.exe","yarn.cmd","pnpm.exe","bun.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (pkgMgrs)
| where FileName in~ ("git.exe","curl.exe","gh.exe","node.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("api.github.com/user/repos","Sha1-Hulud","Shai-Hulud","The Second Coming","bun_environment","setup_bun","--detach",".aws/credentials",".npmrc","id_rsa",".ssh/","GH_TOKEN","NPM_TOKEN")
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("bun_environment.js","setup_bun.js","--detach")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `metrics-trustwallet.com`, `api.metrics-trustwallet.com`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `46faab8ab153fae6e80e7cca38eab363075bb524edd79e42269217a083628f09`, `b74caeaa75e077c99f7d44f46daaf9796a3be43ecf24f2a1fd381844669da777`, `dc67467a39b70d1cd4c1f7f7a459b35058163592f4a9e8fb4dffcbba98ef210c`, `4b2399646573bb737c4969563303d8ee2e9ddbd1b271f1ca9e35ea78062538db`, `62ee164b9b306250c1172583f138c9614139264f889fa99614903c12755468d0`, `f099c5d9ec417d4445a0328ac0ada9cde79fc37410914103ae9c609cbc0ee068`, `cbb9bc5a8496243e02f3cc080efbe3e4a1430ba0671f2e43a202bf45b05479cd`, `a3894003ad1d293ba96d77881ccd2071446dc3f65f434669b49b3da92421901a`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 10 use case(s) fired, 17 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.