# [CRIT] Shai-Hulud Worm Pivots to Multi-Cloud: intercom-client@7.0.4 Hijacked — 361,000 Weekly Downloads, AWS, GCP, and Azure Credentials Now in Scope

**Source:** StepSecurity
**Published:** 2026-05-04
**Article:** https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/shai-hulud-worm-pivots-to-multi-cloud-intercom-client-hijacked

## Threat Profile

Back to Blog Threat Intel A Mini Shai-Hulud Has Appeared: Obfuscated Bun Runtime Payloads Hit SAP-Related npm Packages StepSecurity has detected a new npm supply chain attack campaign using preinstall hooks to download the Bun JavaScript runtime and execute an 11 MB obfuscated payload. At least two SAP-ecosystem packages are confirmed compromised so far. Sai Likhith View LinkedIn April 29, 2026
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## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **SHA256:** `4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34`
- **SHA256:** `80a3d2877813968ef847ae73b5eeeb70b9435254e74d7f07d8cf4057f0a710ac`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1027.002** — Software Packing
- **T1546** — Event Triggered Execution
- **T1554** — Compromise Host Software Binary

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Shai-Hulud npm preinstall: node spawns Bun runtime from bun-dl-* tmpdir

`UC_333_9` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.process_path) as process_path values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_cmd from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=node.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=node) AND (Processes.process_name=bun OR Processes.process_name=bun.exe OR Processes.process_path="*bun-dl-*" OR Processes.process_path="*\\bun-windows-x64-baseline*" OR Processes.process_path="*/bun-linux-x64-baseline*" OR Processes.process_path="*/bun-linux-x64-musl-baseline*" OR Processes.process_path="*/bun-linux-aarch64*" OR Processes.process_path="*/bun-darwin*" OR Processes.process="*execution.js*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node")
| where (FileName in~ ("bun","bun.exe")
      or FolderPath has "bun-dl-"
      or FolderPath has "bun-windows-x64-baseline"
      or FolderPath has "bun-linux-x64-baseline"
      or FolderPath has "bun-linux-x64-musl-baseline"
      or FolderPath has "bun-linux-aarch64"
      or FolderPath has "bun-darwin"
      or ProcessCommandLine has "execution.js")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("setup.mjs","preinstall","npm install","yarn install","pnpm install")
   or FolderPath has "bun-dl-"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          ParentImage = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          ChildImage = FolderPath,
          ChildCmd = ProcessCommandLine,
          SHA256, InitiatingProcessSHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Shai-Hulud AI coding-agent persistence: .claude/settings.json + .vscode/tasks.json drops

`UC_333_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as paths values(Filesystem.process_name) as proc from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.action=created OR Filesystem.action=modified OR Filesystem.action=write) AND (Filesystem.file_path="*\\.claude\\settings.json" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.claude/settings.json" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\.vscode\\tasks.json" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.vscode/tasks.json") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats dc(file_name) as distinct_files by dest user | where distinct_files>=2 | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let _window = 1h;
let _suspect_files = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
    | where (FolderPath endswith @"\.claude\settings.json"
          or FolderPath endswith "/.claude/settings.json"
          or FolderPath endswith @"\.vscode\tasks.json"
          or FolderPath endswith "/.vscode/tasks.json")
    | extend FileKind = case(
        FolderPath has ".claude", "claude_settings",
        FolderPath has ".vscode", "vscode_tasks",
        "other")
    | extend Bucket = bin(Timestamp, _window);
_suspect_files
| summarize FilesDropped = make_set(FileKind),
            FirstSeen = min(Timestamp),
            LastSeen = max(Timestamp),
            Paths = make_set(FolderPath, 50),
            Initiators = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName, 20),
            InitiatingCmds = make_set(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, 20)
            by DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Bucket
| where array_length(FilesDropped) >= 2
   or Initiators has_any ("node.exe","node","bun.exe","bun","git.exe","git")
| order by FirstSeen desc
```

### Shai-Hulud known-bad setup.mjs / execution.js SHA256 hash match

`UC_333_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
`indextime` | tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as path values(Filesystem.process_name) as proc from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_hash IN ("4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34","80a3d2877813968ef847ae73b5eeeb70b9435254e74d7f07d8cf4057f0a710ac") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime) | append [ | tstats summariesonly=t count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_hash IN ("4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34","80a3d2877813968ef847ae73b5eeeb70b9435254e74d7f07d8cf4057f0a710ac") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` ]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let _ShaiHulud_Hashes = dynamic([
    "4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34",  // setup.mjs (loader, identical across all 4 compromised packages)
    "80a3d2877813968ef847ae73b5eeeb70b9435254e74d7f07d8cf4057f0a710ac"   // execution.js (11.6MB obfuscated payload from mbt@1.2.48)
]);
union isfuzzy=true
    ( DeviceFileEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
        | where SHA256 in (_ShaiHulud_Hashes)
        | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
                  InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
                  InitiatingProcessAccountName, Source="DeviceFileEvents" ),
    ( DeviceProcessEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
        | where SHA256 in (_ShaiHulud_Hashes) or InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (_ShaiHulud_Hashes)
        | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType="ProcessCreated", FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
                  InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
                  InitiatingProcessAccountName=AccountName, Source="DeviceProcessEvents" ),
    ( DeviceImageLoadEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
        | where SHA256 in (_ShaiHulud_Hashes)
        | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType="ImageLoaded", FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
                  InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine="",
                  InitiatingProcessAccountName, Source="DeviceImageLoadEvents" )
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Shai-Hulud Worm Pivots to Multi-Cloud: intercom-client@7.0.4 Hijacked — 361,000

`UC_333_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Shai-Hulud Worm Pivots to Multi-Cloud: intercom-client@7.0.4 Hijacked — 361,000 ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("execution.js","install.js","node.js","nordvpn.exe") OR Processes.process_path="*%APPDATA%\CyberGhost\CG6\CyberGhost.dat*" OR Processes.process_path="*%APPDATA%\NordVPN\NordVPN.exe.Config*" OR Processes.process_path="*%APPDATA%\ProtonVPN\user.config*" OR Processes.process_path="*%APPDATA%\Windscribe\Windscribe\*" OR Processes.process_path="*%APPDATA%\EarthVPN\OpenVPN\config\*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*%APPDATA%\CyberGhost\CG6\CyberGhost.dat*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*%APPDATA%\NordVPN\NordVPN.exe.Config*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*%APPDATA%\ProtonVPN\user.config*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*%APPDATA%\Windscribe\Windscribe\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*%APPDATA%\EarthVPN\OpenVPN\config\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*%PROGRAMDATA%\OpenVPN\config\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/usr/bin/env*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("execution.js","install.js","node.js","nordvpn.exe"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Shai-Hulud Worm Pivots to Multi-Cloud: intercom-client@7.0.4 Hijacked — 361,000
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("execution.js", "install.js", "node.js", "nordvpn.exe") or FolderPath has_any ("%APPDATA%\CyberGhost\CG6\CyberGhost.dat", "%APPDATA%\NordVPN\NordVPN.exe.Config", "%APPDATA%\ProtonVPN\user.config", "%APPDATA%\Windscribe\Windscribe\", "%APPDATA%\EarthVPN\OpenVPN\config\"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("%APPDATA%\CyberGhost\CG6\CyberGhost.dat", "%APPDATA%\NordVPN\NordVPN.exe.Config", "%APPDATA%\ProtonVPN\user.config", "%APPDATA%\Windscribe\Windscribe\", "%APPDATA%\EarthVPN\OpenVPN\config\", "%PROGRAMDATA%\OpenVPN\config\", "/usr/bin/env", "/etc/ssh/ssh_host_") or FileName in~ ("execution.js", "install.js", "node.js", "nordvpn.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34`, `80a3d2877813968ef847ae73b5eeeb70b9435254e74d7f07d8cf4057f0a710ac`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 12 use case(s) fired, 17 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.