# [CRIT] Mini Shai-Hulud Is Back: npm Worm Hits over 160 Packages, including Mistral and Tanstack

**Source:** Aikido
**Published:** 2026-05-11
**Article:** https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised

## Threat Profile

Blog Vulnerabilities & Threats Mini Shai-Hulud Is Back: npm Worm Hits over 160 Packages, including Mistral and Tanstack Mini Shai-Hulud Is Back: npm Worm Hits over 160 Packages, including Mistral and Tanstack Written by Raphael Silva Published on: May 12, 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud is back. Like I said before, we were yet to see the full scale of the attack.
The npm campaign we covered in April, when it targeted SAP packages, has now turned into a much larger compromise. Our Malware Team detected 373 …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-45321`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `83.142.209.194`
- **Domain (defanged):** `git-tanstack.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `filev2.getsession.org`
- **SHA256:** `ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c`
- **SHA256:** `2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96`
- **SHA256:** `2258284d65f63829bd67eaba01ef6f1ada2f593f9bbe41678b2df360bd90d3df`
- **SHA1:** `e7d582b98ca80690883175470e96f703ef6dc497`
- **SHA1:** `12ed9a3c1f73617aefdb740480695c04405d7b4b`
- **SHA1:** `12f35b1081b17d21815b35feb57ab03d02482116`
- **SHA1:** `820fa07a7328b6cf2b417078e103721d4d8f2e79`
- **MD5:** `833fd59ebe66a4449982c6d18db656b4`
- **MD5:** `b82e54923f7e440664d2d75bd31588ca`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- **T1546** — Event Triggered Execution
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1547** — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm payload dropped under node_modules (router_init.js / tanstack_runner.js / known SHA256)

`UC_315_9` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name IN ("router_init.js","router_runtime.js","tanstack_runner.js") OR Filesystem.file_hash IN ("ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c","2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96")) AND (Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*" OR Filesystem.process_name IN ("node.exe","npm.cmd","bun.exe","pnpm.cmd","yarn.cmd","node","npm","bun","pnpm","yarn")) by host Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where (FileName in~ ("router_init.js","router_runtime.js","tanstack_runner.js"))
   or SHA256 in ("ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c","2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96")
| where FolderPath has "node_modules"
   or InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node","npm.cmd","npm","pnpm.cmd","pnpm","bun.exe","bun","yarn.cmd","yarn")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Bun spawned with tanstack_runner.js via npm prepare lifecycle (Mini Shai-Hulud)

`UC_315_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="bun.exe" OR Processes.process_name="bun") AND (Processes.process="*tanstack_runner.js*" OR Processes.process="*@tanstack/setup*" OR Processes.parent_process="*79ac49eedf774dd4b0cfa308722bc463cfe5885c*") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN ("node.exe","npm.cmd","pnpm.cmd","yarn.cmd","cmd.exe","sh","bash","node","npm","pnpm","yarn") by host Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("bun.exe","bun")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("tanstack_runner.js","@tanstack/setup")
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "79ac49eedf774dd4b0cfa308722bc463cfe5885c"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node","npm.cmd","npm","pnpm.cmd","pnpm","yarn.cmd","yarn","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","sh","bash")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Mini Shai-Hulud persistence to ~/.claude/hooks and .vscode/tasks.json by node/npm/bun

`UC_315_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path="*\\.claude\\hooks\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.claude/hooks/*" OR (Filesystem.file_name="tasks.json" AND (Filesystem.file_path="*\\.vscode\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.vscode/*"))) Filesystem.process_name IN ("node.exe","npm.cmd","bun.exe","pnpm.cmd","yarn.cmd","node","npm","bun","pnpm","yarn") by host Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where (FolderPath has @"\.claude\hooks" or FolderPath has "/.claude/hooks")
   or (FileName =~ "tasks.json" and (FolderPath has @"\.vscode" or FolderPath has "/.vscode"))
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node","npm.cmd","npm","bun.exe","bun","pnpm.cmd","pnpm","yarn.cmd","yarn")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Crypto-wallet file/keystore access by non-wallet process

`UC_CRYPTO_WALLET` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Ethereum\keystore\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Bitcoin\wallet.dat"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Exodus\exodus.wallet*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Electrum\wallets\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\MetaMask\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Phantom\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Atomic\Local Storage\*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Ethereum\keystore\", @"\Bitcoin\", @"\Exodus\", @"\Electrum\wallets\", @"\MetaMask\", @"\Phantom\", @"\Atomic\Local Storage\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Mini Shai-Hulud Is Back: npm Worm Hits over 160 Packages, including Mistral and

`UC_315_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Mini Shai-Hulud Is Back: npm Worm Hits over 160 Packages, including Mistral and ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("execution.js","router_init.js","tanstack_runner.js","router_runtime.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("execution.js","router_init.js","tanstack_runner.js","router_runtime.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Mini Shai-Hulud Is Back: npm Worm Hits over 160 Packages, including Mistral and
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("execution.js", "router_init.js", "tanstack_runner.js", "router_runtime.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("execution.js", "router_init.js", "tanstack_runner.js", "router_runtime.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-45321`

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `83.142.209.194`, `git-tanstack.com`, `filev2.getsession.org`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c`, `2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96`, `2258284d65f63829bd67eaba01ef6f1ada2f593f9bbe41678b2df360bd90d3df`, `e7d582b98ca80690883175470e96f703ef6dc497`, `12ed9a3c1f73617aefdb740480695c04405d7b4b`, `12f35b1081b17d21815b35feb57ab03d02482116`, `820fa07a7328b6cf2b417078e103721d4d8f2e79`, `833fd59ebe66a4449982c6d18db656b4` _(+1 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 12 use case(s) fired, 14 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.