# [CRIT] TanStack Npm Packages Compromised Inside The Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack

**Source:** Snyk
**Published:** 2026-05-11
**Article:** https://snyk.io/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised/

## Threat Profile

Snyk Blog In this article
Written by Stephen Thoemmes 
May 11, 2026
0 mins read TanStack npm packages compromised: inside the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack On May 11, 2026, between 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious npm package artifacts were published across 42 packages in the @tanstack namespace. The packages were not published by an attacker who stole credentials; they were published by TanStack's legitimate release pipeline, using its trusted OIDC identity, after attacker-controlled cod…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-45321`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1543.001** — Persistence (article-specific)
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1090.003** — Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
- **T1041** — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- **T1071.004** — Application Layer Protocol: DNS

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Mini Shai-Hulud Wave 4 (TanStack/TeamPCP) worm payload file created in node_modules

`UC_318_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_paths values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_names values(Filesystem.user) as users from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name="router_init.js" OR Filesystem.file_name="tanstack_runner.js" OR Filesystem.file_name="vite_setup.mjs") AND Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*" by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let _knownHashes = dynamic(["ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c","2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96"]);
let _affectedNamespaces = dynamic([@"\@tanstack\",@"/@tanstack/",@"\@mistralai\",@"/@mistralai/",@"\@uipath\",@"/@uipath/",@"\@draftlab\",@"/@draftlab/",@"\@draftauth\",@"/@draftauth/",@"\@squawk\",@"/@squawk/"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where FileName in~ ("router_init.js","tanstack_runner.js","vite_setup.mjs")
   or SHA256 in (_knownHashes)
| where FolderPath has "node_modules"
   or FolderPath has_any (_affectedNamespaces)
   or FolderPath has_any ("safe-action","cmux-agent-mcp","nextmove-mcp","ts-dna","cross-stitch")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, FileSize, SHA256,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Session/Oxen P2P exfil DNS or TCP to getsession.org from build/CI host

`UC_318_11` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.src) as src_hosts values(DNS.answer) as answers from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where (DNS.query="*.getsession.org" OR DNS.query="getsession.org" OR DNS.query="filev2.getsession.org" OR DNS.query="seed1.getsession.org" OR DNS.query="seed2.getsession.org" OR DNS.query="seed3.getsession.org") by DNS.src DNS.query
| `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| appendpipe [| tstats summariesonly=t count from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest="*.getsession.org" by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let _sessionDomains = dynamic(["getsession.org","filev2.getsession.org","seed1.getsession.org","seed2.getsession.org","seed3.getsession.org"]);
union isfuzzy=true
  ( DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where RemoteUrl endswith "getsession.org"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Source="NetworkEvent", Indicator=RemoteUrl,
              RemoteIP, RemotePort,
              InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
              InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName ),
  ( DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
    | extend Q = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).QueryName)
    | where Q endswith "getsession.org"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Source="DnsQuery", Indicator=Q,
              RemoteIP=tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).IPAddresses),
              RemotePort=int(null),
              InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
              InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName )
| extend LikelyBuildHost = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node","bun.exe","bun","npm.exe","npm","pnpm.exe","pnpm","yarn.exe","yarn","Runner.Worker.exe","Runner.Worker")
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Ransomware-style mass file rename / extension change

`UC_RANSOM_ENCRYPT` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, dc(Filesystem.file_name) AS files
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("modified","renamed")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, _time span=1m
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| where files > 200
| sort - files
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType in ("FileRenamed","FileModified")
| summarize files = dcount(FileName) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1m)
| where files > 200    // empirical: > 200 unique-file renames in 1m by one account on one host
                       //            is well above the P99 of legitimate bulk-tooling
| order by files desc
```

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — TanStack Npm Packages Compromised Inside The Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack

`UC_318_9` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — TanStack Npm Packages Compromised Inside The Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("router_init.js","tanstack_runner.js","node.js","token-monitor.sh","router_runtime.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/dev/null*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/Library/Preferences/pnpm/rc*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("router_init.js","tanstack_runner.js","node.js","token-monitor.sh","router_runtime.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — TanStack Npm Packages Compromised Inside The Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("router_init.js", "tanstack_runner.js", "node.js", "token-monitor.sh", "router_runtime.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/", "/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist", "/dev/null", "/Library/Preferences/pnpm/rc") or FileName in~ ("router_init.js", "tanstack_runner.js", "node.js", "token-monitor.sh", "router_runtime.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-45321`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 12 use case(s) fired, 20 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.