# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-44791: n8n Has an XML Node Prototype Pollution Patch Bypass

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-05-14
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wrwr-h859-xh2r

## Threat Profile

n8n Has an XML Node Prototype Pollution Patch Bypass

## Impact
An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could bypass the patch for GHSA-hqr4-h3xv-9m3r in the XML node. When combined with other nodes, this could lead to RCE on the n8n host.

## Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.43, 2.20.7, and 2.22.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

## Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, admi…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-44791`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1059.001** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- **T1059.004** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- **T1505.003** — Server Software Component: Web Shell

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### n8n host inventory hunt — surface vulnerable instances < 1.123.43 / 2.20.7 / 2.22.1

`UC_299_1` · phase: **recon** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmdline from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.exe","node") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("node.exe","node")) Processes.process="*n8n*" by host Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node") or FileName in~ ("node.exe","node"))
| where ProcessCommandLine has "n8n" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "n8n"
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp),
            SampleParentCmd = any(InitiatingProcessCommandLine),
            SampleChildCmd  = any(ProcessCommandLine)
            by DeviceName, AccountName
| order by LastSeen desc
```

### n8n Node.js parent spawning OS shell — post-exploit RCE indicator for CVE-2026-44791

`UC_299_2` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as childCmds values(Processes.parent_process) as parentCmd from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("node.exe","node") Processes.parent_process="*n8n*" Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","sh","bash","dash","zsh","ksh") (Processes.process="*curl *" OR Processes.process="*wget *" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-WebRequest*" OR Processes.process="*IEX*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*" OR Processes.process="*base64 *" OR Processes.process="*/dev/tcp/*" OR Processes.process="*/tmp/*" OR Processes.process="*%TEMP%*" OR Processes.process="*-EncodedCommand*" OR Processes.process="*bash -i*" OR Processes.process="*nc -e*") by host Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("n8n","n8n-nodes-base")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","sh","bash","dash","zsh","ksh")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl ","wget ","Invoke-WebRequest","IEX","Invoke-Expression","base64 ","-EncodedCommand","/tmp/","%TEMP%","bash -i","nc -e","perl -e","python -c")
   or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)/dev/tcp/"
   or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\bnc\b.*\b-l\b"
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          ParentImage = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          ParentCmd   = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          ChildImage  = FolderPath,
          ChildCmd    = ProcessCommandLine,
          SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-44791`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 3 use case(s) fired, 4 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.