# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-45311: DeepSeek TUI: run_tests Tool Enables RCE via Malicious Repository Without Approval

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-05-14
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wx44-2q6h-j6p8

## Threat Profile

DeepSeek TUI: run_tests Tool Enables RCE via Malicious Repository Without Approval

### Summary
The `run_tests` tool executes `cargo test` in the workspace with `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`,  meaning it runs without any user approval prompt. The source code explicitly states this design choice:

```rust
fn approval_requirement(&self) -> ApprovalRequirement {
    // Tests are encouraged, so avoid gating them behind approval.
    ApprovalRequirement::Auto
}
```
`cargo test` compiles and executes ar…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-45311`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.004** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- **T1195.001** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1041** — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### DeepSeek-TUI spawning 'cargo test' — CVE-2026-45311 auto-approved run_tests pathway

`UC_293_3` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("deepseek-tui","deepseek-tui.exe","deepseek","deepseek.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("cargo","cargo.exe") AND Processes.process="*test*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("deepseek-tui","deepseek-tui.exe","deepseek","deepseek.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cargo","cargo.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "test"
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName,
          ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          ParentPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          Child = FileName,
          ChildCmd = ProcessCommandLine,
          ChildSHA256 = SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Rust cargo-test binary in target/debug/deps spawning shell or network tool (CVE-2026-45311 exploitation)

`UC_293_4` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_path="*/target/debug/deps/*" OR Processes.parent_process_path="*\\target\\debug\\deps\\*" OR Processes.parent_process_path="*/target/release/deps/*" OR Processes.parent_process_path="*\\target\\release\\deps\\*") AND Processes.process_name IN ("sh","bash","zsh","dash","ksh","curl","wget","nc","ncat","socat","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let _suspicious_children = dynamic(["sh","bash","zsh","dash","ksh","curl","wget","nc","ncat","socat","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","pwsh","curl.exe","wget.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (@"/target/debug/deps/", @"\target\debug\deps\", @"/target/release/deps/", @"\target\release\deps\")
| where FileName in~ (_suspicious_children)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| extend RcePattern = iff(ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl ","wget ","http://","https://","/dev/tcp/","bash -i","-NoProfile","IEX","Invoke-WebRequest"), "likely_egress", "shell_or_tool")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          TestBinaryPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          TestBinary = InitiatingProcessFileName,
          TestBinaryCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          Grandparent = InitiatingProcessParentFileName,
          Child = FileName,
          ChildCmd = ProcessCommandLine,
          RcePattern,
          ChildSHA256 = SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-45311: DeepSeek TUI: run_tests Tool Enables RCE via M

`UC_293_2` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-45311: DeepSeek TUI: run_tests Tool Enables RCE via M ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/malicious-repo*")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-45311: DeepSeek TUI: run_tests Tool Enables RCE via M
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/tmp/malicious-repo"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-45311`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 5 use case(s) fired, 9 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.