# [CRIT] Ongoing exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities

**Source:** Cisco Talos
**Published:** 2026-05-14
**Article:** https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sd-wan-ongoing-exploitation/

## Threat Profile

Ongoing exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities 
By 
Cisco Talos 
Thursday, May 14, 2026 12:02
Threat Advisory
Cisco Talos is tracking the active exploitation of CVE-2026-20182 , an authentication bypass vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, formerly SD-WAN vSmart, and Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly SD-WAN vManage.
Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-20182 allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication and obtain administrative privileges …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20182`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20133`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20128`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20122`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20127`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `38.181.52.89`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `89.125.244.33`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `89.125.244.51`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `71.80.85.135`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `212.83.162.37`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `38.60.214.92`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `65.20.67.134`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `104.233.156.1`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `194.233.100.40`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `194.163.175.135`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `23.27.143.170`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `83.229.126.195`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `13.62.52.206`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `79.135.105.208`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1133** — External Remote Services
- **T1505.003** — Server Software Component: Web Shell
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1573.002** — Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
- **T1095** — Non-Application Layer Protocol
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- **T1059.004** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1098.004** — Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys
- **T1543** — Create or Modify System Process
- **T1548.003** — Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching
- **T1496** — Resource Hijacking

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Inbound exploit attempt to Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager from known UAT-8616 / Cluster IPs

`UC_302_4` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_ip IN ("38.181.52.89","89.125.244.33","89.125.244.51","71.80.85.135","212.83.162.37","38.60.214.92","65.20.67.134","104.233.156.1","194.233.100.40") AND All_Traffic.dest_port IN (443,8443,830,4566,22) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.dest_hostname | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let UAT8616_ExploitIPs = dynamic(["38.181.52.89","89.125.244.33","89.125.244.51","71.80.85.135","212.83.162.37","38.60.214.92","65.20.67.134","104.233.156.1","194.233.100.40"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(60d)
| where RemoteIP in (UAT8616_ExploitIPs) or LocalIP in (UAT8616_ExploitIPs)
| where RemotePort in (443,8443,830,4566,22) or LocalPort in (443,8443,830,4566,22)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### XenShell / Godzilla / Behinder JSP webshell file write on Cisco SD-WAN Manager

`UC_302_5` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("20251117022131.jsp","conf.jsp","sysv.jsp","sysinit.jsp","vmurnp_ikp.jsp") OR Filesystem.file_path="*/vmanage/*webapps/*.jsp") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let WebshellNames = dynamic(["20251117022131.jsp","conf.jsp","sysv.jsp","sysinit.jsp","vmurnp_ikp.jsp"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(60d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where FileName in~ (WebshellNames)
   or (FileName endswith ".jsp" and FolderPath has_any ("/vmanage/","/webapps/","/opt/web-app/","/tomcat/webapps/"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### AdaptixC2 'shadowcore' / Mythic C2 traffic to UAT-8616 infrastructure 194.163.175.135

`UC_302_6` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_ip="194.163.175.135" AND All_Traffic.dest_port IN (4445,7443,31337,22) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime) | appendcols [| tstats summariesonly=t count from datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.ssl.ssl_serial="fece5b954e69b2c6a8d0a1029631a0d7" by All_Certificates.ssl.ssl_serial All_Certificates.dest]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let C2_IP = "194.163.175.135";
let C2_Ports = dynamic([4445, 7443, 31337]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(60d)
| where RemoteIP == C2_IP
| where RemotePort in (C2_Ports) or RemotePort == 22
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### AdaptixC2 'systemd-resolved' or Sliver 'CWan' implant on Linux / SD-WAN host

`UC_302_7` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="systemd-resolved" AND Processes.process_path!="/lib/systemd/systemd-resolved" AND Processes.process_path!="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-resolved") OR Processes.process_name="CWan" OR match(Processes.process,"194\.163\.175\.135") OR match(Processes.process,"23\.27\.143\.170") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let C2_IPs = dynamic(["194.163.175.135","23.27.143.170"]);
let ImpostorPaths = dynamic(["/lib/systemd/systemd-resolved","/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-resolved","/usr/libexec/systemd/systemd-resolved"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(60d)
  | where (FileName =~ "systemd-resolved" and FolderPath !in~ (ImpostorPaths))
     or FileName =~ "CWan"
     or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("194.163.175.135","23.27.143.170")
  | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(60d)
  | where RemoteIP in (C2_IPs)
  | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### UAT-8616 post-compromise on SD-WAN: SSH key add, NETCONF edit, su root, XMRig miner.sh

`UC_302_8` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process IN ("*su root*-c*id*","*/tmp/moneroocean/miner.sh*","*config_background.json*") OR (Processes.process="*authorized_keys*" AND Processes.process_name IN ("bash","sh","tee","echo","cat")) OR (Processes.process="*edit-config*" AND Processes.process="*netconf*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(60d)
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "su root" and ProcessCommandLine has "-c" and ProcessCommandLine has "id")
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/tmp/moneroocean/miner.sh","config_background.json","moneroocean")
   or (ProcessCommandLine has "authorized_keys" and FileName in~ ("bash","sh","tee","echo","cat","dd","cp"))
   or (ProcessCommandLine has "edit-config" and ProcessCommandLine has "netconf")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Ongoing exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities

`UC_302_3` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Ongoing exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("miner.sh","loot_run.sh"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/moneroocean/miner.sh*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/moneroocean/config_background.json*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/dev/null*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("miner.sh","loot_run.sh"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Ongoing exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("miner.sh", "loot_run.sh"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/tmp/moneroocean/miner.sh", "/tmp/moneroocean/config_background.json", "/dev/null") or FileName in~ ("miner.sh", "loot_run.sh"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `38.181.52.89`, `89.125.244.33`, `89.125.244.51`, `71.80.85.135`, `212.83.162.37`, `38.60.214.92`, `65.20.67.134`, `104.233.156.1` _(+6 more)_

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-20182`, `CVE-2026-20133`, `CVE-2026-20128`, `CVE-2026-20122`, `CVE-2026-20127`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 9 use case(s) fired, 17 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.