# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-46421: Supply chain compromise via malicious package versions (@cap-js/sqlite,  @cap-js/postgres, @cap-js/db-service)

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-05-20
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pvw4-cvr4-97p8

## Threat Profile

Supply chain compromise via malicious package versions (@cap-js/sqlite,  @cap-js/postgres, @cap-js/db-service)

## Impact

On April 29, 2026, compromised versions of `@cap-js/sqlite@2.2.2`, `@cap-js/postgres@2.2.2`, and `@cap-js/db-service@2.10.1` were published.
The malicious packages harvested credentials and attempted self-propagation.
If a compromised version was installed, all credentials accessible on that machine (npm tokens, cloud provider credentials, SSH keys, GitHub PATs) should be co…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-46421`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `94.154.172.43`
- **Domain (defanged):** `zero.masscan.cloud`
- **SHA256:** `4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34`
- **SHA256:** `6f933d00b7d05678eb43c90963a80b8947c4ae6830182f89df31da9f568fea95`
- **SHA256:** `eb6eb4154b03ec73218727dc643d26f4e14dfda2438112926bb5daf37ae8bcdb`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — Application Layer Protocol: DNS
- **T1041** — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1552.001** — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Mini Shai-Hulud C2 callback to zero.masscan.cloud / 94.154.172.43

`UC_235_4` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.src) as src values(All_Traffic.dest) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.app) as app from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_ip="94.154.172.43" OR All_Traffic.dest="zero.masscan.cloud" OR All_Traffic.dest="*.masscan.cloud") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | append [| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.query) as query values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution where (DNS.query="zero.masscan.cloud" OR DNS.query="*.masscan.cloud" OR DNS.answer="94.154.172.43") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let MaliciousDomains = dynamic(["zero.masscan.cloud"]);
let MaliciousIPs = dynamic(["94.154.172.43"]);
let NetHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
  | where RemoteIP in (MaliciousIPs) or RemoteUrl has_any (MaliciousDomains)
  | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl,
            InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
            InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
            InitiatingProcessParentFileName;
let DnsHits = DeviceEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
  | where ActionType in ("DnsQueryResponse","DnsConnectionInspected","InboundConnectionAccepted")
  | where RemoteUrl has_any (MaliciousDomains) or RemoteIP in (MaliciousIPs)
     or AdditionalFields has "masscan.cloud" or AdditionalFields has "94.154.172.43"
  | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl,
            InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AdditionalFields;
union NetHits, DnsHits
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Compromised @cap-js stealer artefact hash present on disk or in execution

`UC_235_5` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_hash IN ("4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34","6f933d00b7d05678eb43c90963a80b8947c4ae6830182f89df31da9f568fea95","eb6eb4154b03ec73218727dc643d26f4e14dfda2438112926bb5daf37ae8bcdb")) by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | append [| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_hash IN ("4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34","6f933d00b7d05678eb43c90963a80b8947c4ae6830182f89df31da9f568fea95","eb6eb4154b03ec73218727dc643d26f4e14dfda2438112926bb5daf37ae8bcdb")) by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let CapJsHashes = dynamic([
  "4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34",
  "6f933d00b7d05678eb43c90963a80b8947c4ae6830182f89df31da9f568fea95",
  "eb6eb4154b03ec73218727dc643d26f4e14dfda2438112926bb5daf37ae8bcdb"]);
let FileHits = DeviceFileEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(90d)
  | where SHA256 in (CapJsHashes)
  | project Timestamp, Source="DeviceFileEvents", DeviceId, DeviceName,
            FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
            InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
            InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath;
let ProcHits = DeviceProcessEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(90d)
  | where SHA256 in (CapJsHashes) or InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (CapJsHashes)
  | project Timestamp, Source="DeviceProcessEvents", DeviceId, DeviceName,
            FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
            InitiatingProcessFileName=InitiatingProcessFileName,
            InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName=AccountName,
            InitiatingProcessFolderPath=InitiatingProcessFolderPath;
let ImgHits = DeviceImageLoadEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(90d)
  | where SHA256 in (CapJsHashes)
  | project Timestamp, Source="DeviceImageLoadEvents", DeviceId, DeviceName,
            FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
            InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
            InitiatingProcessAccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName,
            InitiatingProcessFolderPath;
union FileHits, ProcHits, ImgHits
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-46421`

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `94.154.172.43`, `zero.masscan.cloud`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34`, `6f933d00b7d05678eb43c90963a80b8947c4ae6830182f89df31da9f568fea95`, `eb6eb4154b03ec73218727dc643d26f4e14dfda2438112926bb5daf37ae8bcdb`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 6 use case(s) fired, 10 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.