# [CRIT] The Wild West of VS Code extensions and how a poisoned extension breached GitHub

**Source:** Aikido
**Published:** 2026-05-20
**Article:** https://www.aikido.dev/blog/vs-code-extension-github-breach

## Threat Profile

Blog Vulnerabilities & Threats The Wild West of VS Code extensions and how a poisoned extension breached GitHub The Wild West of VS Code extensions and how a poisoned extension breached GitHub Written by Raphael Silva Published on: May 20, 2026 Eighteen Minutes, 2.2 Million Targets
It's been a hard week for GitHub. Yesterday GitHub confirmed it had been breached . The attackers reportedly pulled data from roughly 3,700 internal repositories , and the entry point was a poisoned VS Code extension …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-48027`
- **SHA256:** `1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8`
- **SHA256:** `b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74`
- **SHA256:** `e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1`
- **SHA256:** `43f2b001846c4966073ebffa5be8f15e491a1e7d32bbd805d57406ff540e0dd9`
- **SHA1:** `558b09d7ad0d1660e2a0fb8a06da81a6f42e06d2`
- **SHA1:** `ba642fe2c7c65e42dd7f6444b83023dc6827e08c`
- **SHA1:** `acfc3f957a63b4cde93ff645f2b6bf26a8ed1bbf`
- **SHA1:** `9d88f040c44b5f4d5f9db15ff89310776c168e99`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1102.001** — Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
- **T1543.001** — Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
- **T1059.006** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- **T1564.012** — Hide Artifacts: File/Path Exclusions
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- **T1552.001** — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- **T1552.004** — Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
- **T1083** — File and Directory Discovery

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Nx Console v18.95.0 compromised extension installed (May 2026 supply-chain attack)

`UC_236_9` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*nrwl.angular-console-18.95.0*","*nrwl.angular-console\\18.95.0*") OR Filesystem.file_hash IN ("1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8","b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74","e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1","43f2b001846c4966073ebffa5be8f15e491a1e7d32bbd805d57406ff540e0dd9","558b09d7ad0d1660e2a0fb8a06da81a6f42e06d2","ba642fe2c7c65e42dd7f6444b83023dc6827e08c","acfc3f957a63b4cde93ff645f2b6bf26a8ed1bbf","9d88f040c44b5f4d5f9db15ff89310776c168e99") by host Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FolderPath has "nrwl.angular-console-18.95.0")
   or (SHA256 in~ ("1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8","b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74","e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1","43f2b001846c4966073ebffa5be8f15e491a1e7d32bbd805d57406ff540e0dd9"))
   or (SHA1 in~ ("558b09d7ad0d1660e2a0fb8a06da81a6f42e06d2","ba642fe2c7c65e42dd7f6444b83023dc6827e08c","acfc3f957a63b4cde93ff645f2b6bf26a8ed1bbf","9d88f040c44b5f4d5f9db15ff89310776c168e99"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, SHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### VS Code/Cursor extension host fetches dropper from nrwl/nx orphan commit on GitHub

`UC_236_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.url IN ("*raw.githubusercontent.com/nrwl/nx/*","*codeload.github.com/nrwl/nx/*","*api.github.com/repos/nrwl/nx/git/blobs/*","*api.github.com/repos/nrwl/nx/git/trees/*")) AND Web.src_app IN ("code.exe","cursor.exe","node.exe","Code Helper","Code Helper (Plugin)") by host Web.dest Web.url Web.src_app Web.user Web.bytes_in | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | where bytes_in > 100000 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("code.exe","cursor.exe","node.exe","code-insiders.exe","codium.exe","Code Helper","Code Helper (Plugin)","cursor-helper")
   or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ("code.exe","cursor.exe","code-insiders.exe")
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("raw.githubusercontent.com/nrwl/nx/","codeload.github.com/nrwl/nx/","api.github.com/repos/nrwl/nx/git/blobs","api.github.com/repos/nrwl/nx/git/trees")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### macOS Python backdoor persistence via kitty-monitor LaunchAgent and cat.py drop

`UC_236_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/.local/share/kitty/cat.py","*/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.kitty-monitor.plist","/var/tmp/.gh_update_state","/tmp/kitty-*") by host Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.process_path Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FolderPath endswith "/.local/share/kitty/cat.py")
   or (FolderPath endswith "/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.kitty-monitor.plist")
   or (FolderPath == "/var/tmp/.gh_update_state")
   or (FolderPath startswith "/tmp/kitty-")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Python backdoor self-daemonisation via __DAEMONIZED=1 spawned by VS Code helper or node

`UC_236_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("python","python3","python3.9","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12") AND (Processes.process IN ("*cat.py*","*/.local/share/kitty/*","*/tmp/kitty-*","*__DAEMONIZED=1*") OR Processes.parent_process IN ("*__DAEMONIZED=1*","*cat.py*")) AND Processes.parent_process_name IN ("node","Code Helper","Code Helper (Plugin)","Code","Cursor","cursor-helper","sh","zsh","bash","python","python3") by host Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("python","python3","python3.9","python3.10","python3.11","python3.12","python.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("cat.py","/.local/share/kitty/","/tmp/kitty-","__DAEMONIZED=1")
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("__DAEMONIZED=1","cat.py","/.local/share/kitty/")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node","node.exe","Code Helper","Code Helper (Plugin)","Code","Cursor","cursor-helper","sh","zsh","bash","python","python3")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### VS Code extension host fan-out reads of developer secrets (.ssh, .aws, .npmrc, ~/.claude/settings.json)

`UC_236_13` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count dc(Filesystem.file_path) as distinct_paths values(Filesystem.file_path) as paths min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/.ssh/id_rsa","*/.ssh/id_ed25519","*/.ssh/id_ecdsa","*/.ssh/known_hosts","*/.ssh/config","*/.aws/credentials","*/.aws/config","*/.npmrc","*/.config/gcloud/*","*/.kube/config","*/.docker/config.json","*/.gnupg/*","*/.claude/settings.json","*/.env","*/.env.*")) AND Filesystem.process_name IN ("node","node.exe","Code Helper","Code Helper (Plugin)","cursor-helper","Cursor","Code","python","python3") by host Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name span=10m | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where distinct_paths >= 4 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileAccessed","FileRead","FileOpened")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node","node.exe","Code Helper","Code Helper (Plugin)","cursor-helper","Cursor","Code","code.exe","cursor.exe","python","python3")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/.ssh/","/.aws/","/.config/gcloud/","/.kube/","/.docker/","/.gnupg/","/.claude/")
     or FileName in~ ("id_rsa","id_ed25519","id_ecdsa","credentials","known_hosts","authorized_keys",".npmrc","settings.json","config.json")
     or FileName =~ ".env" or FileName startswith ".env." or FolderPath has "/.npmrc")
| where not (FolderPath has "/.claude/" and FileName != "settings.json")    // narrow .claude noise — only the settings.json file matters
| summarize PathCount = dcount(strcat(FolderPath, FileName)),
            Paths = make_set(strcat(FolderPath, FileName), 25),
            FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp)
            by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp, 10m)
| where PathCount >= 4    // 4 = sweep threshold; one-off .env read is normal dev work, ≥4 distinct cred files in 10 min is harvesting behaviour
| order by FirstSeen desc
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — The Wild West of VS Code extensions and how a poisoned extension breached GitHub

`UC_236_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — The Wild West of VS Code extensions and how a poisoned extension breached GitHub ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("timeago.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("timeago.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — The Wild West of VS Code extensions and how a poisoned extension breached GitHub
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("timeago.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("timeago.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-48027`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8`, `b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74`, `e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1`, `43f2b001846c4966073ebffa5be8f15e491a1e7d32bbd805d57406ff540e0dd9`, `558b09d7ad0d1660e2a0fb8a06da81a6f42e06d2`, `ba642fe2c7c65e42dd7f6444b83023dc6827e08c`, `acfc3f957a63b4cde93ff645f2b6bf26a8ed1bbf`, `9d88f040c44b5f4d5f9db15ff89310776c168e99`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 14 use case(s) fired, 22 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.