# [CRIT] Tracking Iranian APT Screening Serpens’ 2026 Espionage Campaigns

**Source:** Unit 42 (Palo Alto)
**Published:** 2026-05-22
**Article:** https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-iran-apt-screening-serpens/

## Threat Profile

Threat Research Center 
Threat Actor Groups 
Malware 
Malware 
Tracking Iranian APT Screening Serpens’ 2026 Espionage Campaigns 
20 min read 
Related Products Advanced DNS Security Advanced URL Filtering Advanced WildFire Cloud-Delivered Security Services Cortex Cortex Cloud Cortex XDR Cortex XSIAM Unit 42 Incident Response 
By: Unit 42 
Published: May 22, 2026 
Categories: Malware 
Threat Actor Groups 
Tags: Advanced Persistent Threat 
AppDomainManager 
DLL Sideloading 
Iran 
MiniJunk 
MiniUpda…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `business-startup.org`
- **Domain (defanged):** `buisness-centeral-transportation.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `premierhealthadvisory.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `ramiltonsfinance.com`
- **SHA256:** `44f4f7aca7f1d9bfdaf7b3736934cbe19f851a707662f8f0b0c49b383e054250`
- **SHA256:** `332ba2f0297dfb1599adecc3e9067893e7cf243aa23aedce4906a4c480574c17`
- **SHA256:** `0db36a04d304ad96f9e6f97b531934594cd95a5cea9ff2c9af249201089dc864`
- **SHA256:** `38bd137c672bd58d08c4f0502f993a6561e2c3411773d1ae57ee0151a0a9d11d`
- **SHA256:** `d4a7e9f107fe40c1a5d0139c6c6e25bf6bf57f61feff090bee28f476bb3cc3c2`
- **SHA256:** `bc3b44154518c5794ce639108e7b9c5fecb0c189607a26de1aaed518d890c7ad`
- **SHA256:** `74882085db2088356ed7f72f01e0404a0a98cda88ef56fb15ce74c1f36b26d27`
- **SHA256:** `9cf029daca89523d917dafed0568d11d00e45ec96b5b90b4a1f7fd4018c7da84`
- **SHA256:** `b19e06da580cf91691eda066ac9ee4b09c6e5dc26c367af12660fe1f9306eec4`
- **SHA256:** `8808c794c24367438f183e4be941876f1d3ecd0c8d2eb43b10d2380841d2283b`
- **SHA256:** `43dc62cef52ebdd69e79f10015b3e13890f26c058325c0ff139c70f8d8eadcfa`
- **SHA256:** `9e4a658e6d831c9e9bdfe11884a75b7c64812ed0a80e8495ddf6b316505acac1`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1053.005** — Scheduled Task
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1053.005** — Persistence (article-specific)
- **T1543.003** — Persistence (article-specific)
- **T1574.002** — DLL Side-Loading
- **T1574.014** — AppDomainManager Injection
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — Application Layer Protocol: DNS
- **T1583.001** — Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- **T1566.001** — Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### MiniUpdate UpdateChecker.dll sideload via legitimate signed .NET host

`UC_217_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="UpdateChecker.dll" OR Filesystem.file_hash IN ("44f4f7aca7f1d9bfdaf7b3736934cbe19f851a707662f8f0b0c49b383e054250","332ba2f0297dfb1599adecc3e9067893e7cf243aa23aedce4906a4c480574c17","0db36a04d304ad96f9e6f97b531934594cd95a5cea9ff2c9af249201089dc864","38bd137c672bd58d08c4f0502f993a6561e2c3411773d1ae57ee0151a0a9d11d","d4a7e9f107fe40c1a5d0139c6c6e25bf6bf57f61feff090bee28f476bb3cc3c2","bc3b44154518c5794ce639108e7b9c5fecb0c189607a26de1aaed518d890c7ad","74882085db2088356ed7f72f01e0404a0a98cda88ef56fb15ce74c1f36b26d27","9cf029daca89523d917dafed0568d11d00e45ec96b5b90b4a1f7fd4018c7da84") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where match(file_path,"(?i)\\\\(Users|AppData|Temp|Downloads|ProgramData)\\\\")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let knownHashes = dynamic(["44f4f7aca7f1d9bfdaf7b3736934cbe19f851a707662f8f0b0c49b383e054250","332ba2f0297dfb1599adecc3e9067893e7cf243aa23aedce4906a4c480574c17","0db36a04d304ad96f9e6f97b531934594cd95a5cea9ff2c9af249201089dc864","38bd137c672bd58d08c4f0502f993a6561e2c3411773d1ae57ee0151a0a9d11d","d4a7e9f107fe40c1a5d0139c6c6e25bf6bf57f61feff090bee28f476bb3cc3c2","bc3b44154518c5794ce639108e7b9c5fecb0c189607a26de1aaed518d890c7ad","74882085db2088356ed7f72f01e0404a0a98cda88ef56fb15ce74c1f36b26d27","9cf029daca89523d917dafed0568d11d00e45ec96b5b90b4a1f7fd4018c7da84"]);
let imgLoads = DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName =~ "UpdateChecker.dll" or SHA256 in (knownHashes)
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Users\", @"\AppData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Downloads\", @"\ProgramData\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, LoadedDll=FileName, LoadedDllPath=FolderPath, SHA256;
let fileWrites = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName =~ "UpdateChecker.dll" or SHA256 in (knownHashes)
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Users\", @"\AppData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Downloads\", @"\ProgramData\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, WrittenDll=FileName, WrittenPath=FolderPath, SHA256;
union imgLoads, fileWrites
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !endswith "$"
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Screening Serpens AppDomainManager hijack via .NET app .config tampering

`UC_217_13` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.exe.config" by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where match(file_path,"(?i)\\\\(Users|AppData|Temp|Downloads|ProgramData)\\\\") AND NOT match(process_name,"(?i)(msiexec|trustedinstaller|wusa|setup|installer|update)\.exe$")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName endswith ".exe.config"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Users\", @"\AppData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Downloads\", @"\ProgramData\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("msiexec.exe","TrustedInstaller.exe","wusa.exe","setup.exe","installer.exe","OfficeClickToRun.exe","GoogleUpdate.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files"
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files (x86)"
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where FileName endswith ".dll"
    | where FolderPath has_any (@"\Users\", @"\AppData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Downloads\", @"\ProgramData\")
    | project DllTime=Timestamp, DeviceId, DllFolder=FolderPath, DllName=FileName, DllSHA256=SHA256, DllWriter=InitiatingProcessFileName
) on DeviceId
| where abs(datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, DllTime)) < 300 and tolower(FolderPath) == tolower(DllFolder)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ConfigPath=FolderPath, ConfigName=FileName, DllName, DllSHA256, DllWriter, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Screening Serpens C2 — DNS/network to UNC1549 infrastructure (Feb-Apr 2026)

`UC_217_14` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where DNS.query IN ("business-startup.org","buisness-centeral-transportation.com","premierhealthadvisory.com","ramiltonsfinance.com","*.business-startup.org","*.buisness-centeral-transportation.com","*.premierhealthadvisory.com","*.ramiltonsfinance.com") by DNS.query DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | append [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where Web.url IN ("*business-startup.org*","*buisness-centeral-transportation.com*","*premierhealthadvisory.com*","*ramiltonsfinance.com*") by Web.src Web.url Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let c2Domains = dynamic(["business-startup.org","buisness-centeral-transportation.com","premierhealthadvisory.com","ramiltonsfinance.com"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(90d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (c2Domains) or RemoteUrl endswith ".business-startup.org" or RemoteUrl endswith ".buisness-centeral-transportation.com" or RemoteUrl endswith ".premierhealthadvisory.com" or RemoteUrl endswith ".ramiltonsfinance.com"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Protocol
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Screening Serpens recruitment lure — Hiring Portal.zip + job requisition PDFs

`UC_217_15` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Email.src_user) as sender values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient values(All_Email.subject) as subject from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.file_name="Hiring Portal.zip" OR All_Email.file_name="Hiring_Portal.zip" OR All_Email.subject IN ("*Hiring Portal*","*Job Requisition*","*JR2058*") by All_Email.message_id All_Email.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | append [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("Hiring Portal.zip","Hiring_Portal.zip") OR (Filesystem.file_name="*Job ID JR*.pdf" AND Filesystem.file_path="*\\Downloads\\*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let lureFileNames = dynamic(["Hiring Portal.zip","Hiring_Portal.zip","HiringPortal.zip"]);
let email = EmailAttachmentInfo
| where Timestamp > ago(60d)
| where FileName in~ (lureFileNames) or FileName matches regex @"(?i)^.*Software Engineer.*Job ID JR\d{6}.*\.pdf$" or FileName matches regex @"(?i)^.*Senior.*Engineer.*Job ID JR\d{6}.*\.pdf$"
| join kind=leftouter (EmailEvents | project NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation) on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, FileName, FileType, SHA256, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation;
let host = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(60d)
| where (FileName in~ (lureFileNames)) or (FileName matches regex @"(?i)^.*(Software|Senior|Principal).*Engineer.*Job ID JR\d{6}.*\.pdf$")
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Downloads\", @"\Desktop\", @"\Temp\", @"\AppData\Local\Temp\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, FileOriginUrl;
union email, host
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Scheduled task created with suspicious image / encoded args

`UC_SCHEDULED_TASK` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name="schtasks.exe" AND Processes.process="*/create*"
      AND (Processes.process="*powershell*" OR Processes.process="*cmd.exe*"
        OR Processes.process="*rundll32*" OR Processes.process="*-enc*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*\Users\Public*"
        OR Processes.process="*\AppData\*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("powershell","cmd.exe","rundll32","-enc","FromBase64","\Users\Public","\AppData\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Tracking Iranian APT Screening Serpens’ 2026 Espionage Campaigns

`UC_217_11` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Tracking Iranian APT Screening Serpens’ 2026 Espionage Campaigns ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("updatechecker.dll","initinstall.dll","updater.dll","uevmonitor.dll","softwarelicencing.exe","unbcl.dll","connection.dll","systemtupdatetaskmachine.exe"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("updatechecker.dll","initinstall.dll","updater.dll","uevmonitor.dll","softwarelicencing.exe","unbcl.dll","connection.dll","systemtupdatetaskmachine.exe"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Tracking Iranian APT Screening Serpens’ 2026 Espionage Campaigns
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("updatechecker.dll", "initinstall.dll", "updater.dll", "uevmonitor.dll", "softwarelicencing.exe", "unbcl.dll", "connection.dll", "systemtupdatetaskmachine.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("updatechecker.dll", "initinstall.dll", "updater.dll", "uevmonitor.dll", "softwarelicencing.exe", "unbcl.dll", "connection.dll", "systemtupdatetaskmachine.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `business-startup.org`, `buisness-centeral-transportation.com`, `premierhealthadvisory.com`, `ramiltonsfinance.com`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `44f4f7aca7f1d9bfdaf7b3736934cbe19f851a707662f8f0b0c49b383e054250`, `332ba2f0297dfb1599adecc3e9067893e7cf243aa23aedce4906a4c480574c17`, `0db36a04d304ad96f9e6f97b531934594cd95a5cea9ff2c9af249201089dc864`, `38bd137c672bd58d08c4f0502f993a6561e2c3411773d1ae57ee0151a0a9d11d`, `d4a7e9f107fe40c1a5d0139c6c6e25bf6bf57f61feff090bee28f476bb3cc3c2`, `bc3b44154518c5794ce639108e7b9c5fecb0c189607a26de1aaed518d890c7ad`, `74882085db2088356ed7f72f01e0404a0a98cda88ef56fb15ce74c1f36b26d27`, `9cf029daca89523d917dafed0568d11d00e45ec96b5b90b4a1f7fd4018c7da84` _(+4 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 16 use case(s) fired, 25 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.