# [CRIT] Out of the Crypt: The Evolving Cyber Extortion Economy

**Source:** Unit 42 (Palo Alto)
**Published:** 2026-05-27
**Article:** https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cyber-extortion-economy/

## Threat Profile

Threat Research Center 
Insights 
General 
General 
Out of the Crypt: The Evolving Cyber Extortion Economy 
8 min read 
Related Products Unit 42 Frontier AI Defense Unit 42 Incident Response 
By: Matt Brady 
Justin Moore 
Published: May 27, 2026 
Categories: Cybercrime 
General 
Insights 
Tags: Bling Libra 
Extortion 
Frontier AI 
Hazy Scorpius 
Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters 
ShinyHunters 
Supply chain 
Telegram 
TGR-CRI-1135 
Extortion Activity No Longer Requires Encryption for Payment 
This blog d…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2025-61882`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-45321`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1552.001** — Credentials In Files
- **T1567.002** — Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- **T1102** — Web Service
- **T1041** — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- **T1556.006** — Multi-Factor Authentication
- **T1098.005** — Device Registration
- **T1566.004** — Spearphishing Voice
- **T1059.004** — Unix Shell
- **T1505.003** — Web Shell

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Shai-Hulud npm postinstall reads cloud credential files (~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.kube, gcloud ADC)

`UC_193_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.process_name) as proc from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.process_name IN ("node.exe","node","npm.exe","npm","yarn.exe","yarn","pnpm.exe","pnpm")) AND (Filesystem.file_path="*\\.aws\\credentials" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.aws/credentials" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\.ssh\\id_rsa*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.ssh/id_*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\.kube\\config" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.kube/config" OR Filesystem.file_path="*application_default_credentials.json" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\gcloud\\credentials.db") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node","npm.exe","npm","yarn.exe","yarn","pnpm.exe","pnpm")
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\.aws\credentials", @"/.aws/credentials", @"\.ssh\id_rsa", @"/.ssh/id_rsa", @"\.ssh\id_ed25519", @"/.ssh/id_ed25519", @"\.kube\config", @"/.kube/config", @"application_default_credentials.json", @"\gcloud\credentials.db")
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed","FileAccessed")
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Shai-Hulud exfiltration: node.exe POSTs to api.github.com creating public repo

`UC_193_11` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest) as dest values(All_Traffic.app) as app min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.app IN ("node.exe","node","npm.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe") AND (All_Traffic.dest="api.github.com" OR All_Traffic.dest="uploads.github.com" OR All_Traffic.dest="raw.githubusercontent.com") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let creds = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","npm.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe")
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\.aws\credentials", @"/.aws/credentials", @"\.ssh\id_", @"/.ssh/id_", @"\.kube\config", @"application_default_credentials.json")
| project CredTime=Timestamp, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","npm.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe")
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("api.github.com","uploads.github.com")
| join kind=inner creds on DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId
| where Timestamp between (CredTime .. CredTime + 10m)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, CredTime
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Bling Libra: Entra device join immediately after vishing-driven MFA registration

`UC_193_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Change where Change.action="created" AND (Change.object_category="device" OR Change.command="Add device" OR Change.command="Add registered owner to device") by Change.user Change.src Change.object Change.object_category _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Change)` | rename user as upn | join type=inner upn [| tstats `summariesonly` values(Authentication.src) as signin_src min(_time) as signin_time from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.app="AzureActiveDirectory" AND Authentication.action="success" AND Authentication.authentication_method="MFA" by Authentication.user | rename Authentication.user as upn] | where _time - signin_time < 1800 AND _time - signin_time > -60 | table _time upn signin_src src object object_category
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let lookback = 7d;
let signins = AADSignInEventsBeta
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ErrorCode == 0
| where IsInteractive == true
| where RiskLevelDuringSignIn in ("medium","high") or RiskState == "atRisk" or NetworkLocationDetails !has "trustedNamedLocation"
| project SignInTime=Timestamp, AccountUpn, SignInIP=IPAddress, SignInCountry=Country, AppDisplayName;
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where Application == "Office 365" or ApplicationId == 11161
| where ActionType in ("Add device","Add registered owner to device","Update device","Register device")
| extend Upn = tostring(AccountDisplayName)
| join kind=inner signins on $left.AccountObjectId == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (SignInTime .. SignInTime + 30m)
| project Timestamp, SignInTime, DelaySec=datetime_diff('second',Timestamp,SignInTime), AccountDisplayName, SignInIP, SignInCountry, IPAddress, ActionType, ObjectName, RawEventData
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Hazy Scorpius (CL0P) Oracle EBS exploitation via CVE-2025-61882 — concurrent processing spawns shell/wget

`UC_193_13` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmd from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN ("java","java.exe","FNDLIBR","FNDLIBR.exe","httpd","httpd.exe")) AND (Processes.parent_process="*oracle*" OR Processes.parent_process="*EBS*" OR Processes.parent_process="*fs_inst*" OR Processes.parent_process="*ConcurrentProcessing*") AND (Processes.process_name IN ("sh","bash","ksh","zsh","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wget","curl","perl","python","python3","nc","ncat")) by host Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java","java.exe","FNDLIBR","FNDLIBR.exe","httpd","httpd.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("oracle","EBS","fs_inst","appsutil","FMW_Home","comn/util","Concurrent")
| where FileName in~ ("sh","bash","ksh","zsh","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wget","curl","perl","python","python3","nc","ncat","certutil.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine !has "adstrtal" and ProcessCommandLine !has "adstpall"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessId
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Ransomware-style mass file rename / extension change

`UC_RANSOM_ENCRYPT` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, dc(Filesystem.file_name) AS files
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("modified","renamed")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, _time span=1m
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| where files > 200
| sort - files
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType in ("FileRenamed","FileModified")
| summarize files = dcount(FileName) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1m)
| where files > 200    // empirical: > 200 unique-file renames in 1m by one account on one host
                       //            is well above the P99 of legitimate bulk-tooling
| order by files desc
```

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2025-61882`, `CVE-2026-45321`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 14 use case(s) fired, 27 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.