# [HIGH] What MDM can't protect on developer machines (and what to do about it)

**Source:** Aikido
**Published:** 2026-05-28
**Article:** https://www.aikido.dev/blog/what-mdm-cant-protect

## Threat Profile

Blog Guides & Best Practices What MDM can't protect on developer machines (and what to do about it) What MDM can't protect on developer machines (and what to do about it) Written by Nicholas Thomson Published on: May 28, 2026 Mobile Device Management (MDM) is a type of software used by organizations to secure, manage, and monitor their employees' mobile devices. Tools like Jamf, Kandji, and Microsoft Intune give IT teams visibility and control over every sanctioned application across the fleet. …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `cyberhavenext.pro`
- **Domain (defanged):** `giftshop.club`
- **Domain (defanged):** `filev2.getsession.org`
- **SHA256:** `ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c`
- **SHA256:** `2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96`
- **SHA256:** `1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8`
- **SHA256:** `b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74`
- **SHA256:** `e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1`
- **SHA1:** `558b09d7ad0d1660e2a0fb8a06da81a6f42e06d2`
- **SHA1:** `ba642fe2c7c65e42dd7f6444b83023dc6827e08c`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1567** — Exfiltration Over Web Service
- **T1552.001** — Credentials In Files
- **T1546** — Event Triggered Execution
- **T1567.002** — Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- **T1071.003** — Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1546.016** — Installer Packages

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Cyberhaven trojanized Chrome extension C2 callback to cyberhavenext.pro

`UC_186_10` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query="cyberhavenext.pro" OR DNS.query="*.cyberhavenext.pro" by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let IOC = dynamic(["cyberhavenext.pro"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (IOC)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm exfil to filev2.getsession.org

`UC_186_11` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_host="filev2.getsession.org" OR All_Traffic.dest="filev2.getsession.org") AND All_Traffic.app IN ("node.exe","npm.exe","npx.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","bun.exe","node","npm","yarn","pnpm","bun","curl.exe","wget.exe") by host All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.app All_Traffic.dest_host All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let PkgMgrs = dynamic(["node.exe","npm.exe","npm.cmd","npx.exe","npx.cmd","yarn.exe","yarn.cmd","pnpm.exe","pnpm.cmd","bun.exe","node","npm","yarn","pnpm","bun","curl.exe","wget.exe"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has "filev2.getsession.org" or RemoteUrl has "getsession.org"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (PkgMgrs)
   or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ (PkgMgrs)
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("setup_bun.js","bun_environment.js","node_modules")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Shai-Hulud worm GitHub Action workflow file dropped under .github/workflows

`UC_186_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("shai-hulud-workflow.yml","shai-hulud.yaml","shai-hulud.yml","discussion.yaml","discussion.yml") AND (Filesystem.file_path="*\\.github\\workflows\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.github/workflows/*") by host Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let WormFiles = dynamic(["shai-hulud-workflow.yml","shai-hulud.yaml","shai-hulud.yml","discussion.yaml","discussion.yml"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where FileName in~ (WormFiles)
| where FolderPath has @"\.github\workflows" or FolderPath has "/.github/workflows"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### postmark-mcp BCC exfil to giftshop.club

`UC_186_13` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query="giftshop.club" OR DNS.query="*.giftshop.club" by DNS.src DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | appendcols [| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Email where Email.recipient="*@giftshop.club" by Email.src_user Email.recipient Email.subject | `drop_dm_object_name(Email)`] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let IOC = dynamic(["giftshop.club"]);
let Net = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where RemoteUrl has_any (IOC)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Actor=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Cmd=InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Indicator=RemoteUrl, Path="network";
let Mail = EmailEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where RecipientEmailAddress has_any (IOC) or SenderFromAddress has_any (IOC)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName="", Actor=SenderFromAddress, Process="", Cmd=Subject, Indicator=RecipientEmailAddress, Path="mail";
union Net, Mail
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### npm/yarn/pnpm postinstall hook spawning credential-harvest tooling

`UC_186_14` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN ("npm.exe","npx.exe","node.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","bun.exe","npm","npx","node","yarn","pnpm","bun")) AND (Processes.process_name IN ("trufflehog.exe","trufflehog","curl.exe","wget.exe","bun.exe") OR Processes.process="*setup_bun.js*" OR Processes.process="*bun_environment.js*" OR Processes.process="*trufflehog*" OR Processes.process="*webhook.site*" OR Processes.process="*filev2.getsession.org*" OR Processes.process="*giftshop.club*") by host Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let PkgMgrs = dynamic(["npm.exe","npm.cmd","npx.exe","npx.cmd","yarn.exe","yarn.cmd","pnpm.exe","pnpm.cmd","node.exe","bun.exe","npm","npx","node","yarn","pnpm","bun"]);
let SuspChildren = dynamic(["trufflehog.exe","trufflehog","curl.exe","wget.exe","bun.exe"]);
let SuspStrings = dynamic(["setup_bun.js","bun_environment.js","trufflehog","webhook.site","filev2.getsession.org","giftshop.club"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (PkgMgrs)
   or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ (PkgMgrs)
| where FileName in~ (SuspChildren)
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspStrings)
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspStrings)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `cyberhavenext.pro`, `giftshop.club`, `filev2.getsession.org`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c`, `2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96`, `1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8`, `b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74`, `e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1`, `558b09d7ad0d1660e2a0fb8a06da81a6f42e06d2`, `ba642fe2c7c65e42dd7f6444b83023dc6827e08c`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 15 use case(s) fired, 25 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.