# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47416: praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can promote themselves or others to owner via PATCH /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id}

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-05-29
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c2m8-4gcg-v22g

## Threat Profile

praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can promote themselves or others to owner via PATCH /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id}

## Summary

**Type:** Vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role="member"` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member's role t…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-47416`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1068** — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- **T1098** — Account Manipulation
- **T1531** — Account Access Removal
- **T1136.003** — Create Account: Cloud Account
- **T1213** — Data from Information Repositories
- **T1530** — Data from Cloud Storage
- **T1087.004** — Account Discovery: Cloud Account

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### praisonai-platform CVE-2026-47416: PATCH /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id} role-change request

`UC_162_2` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Web.url) as urls values(Web.status) as statuses values(Web.user) as users from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method=PATCH Web.url="*/workspaces/*/members/*" by Web.src Web.user Web.dest Web.http_user_agent | rename Web.* as * | regex url="/workspaces/[^/]+/members/[^/?#]+" | where statuses="200" OR statuses="204" | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

### praisonai-platform CVE-2026-47416: Member self-promotion + legitimate-owner demotion chain within one hour

`UC_162_3` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count values(Web.url) as urls values(Web.status) as statuses min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method=PATCH Web.url="*/workspaces/*/members/*" Web.status IN (200,204) by Web.src Web.user _time span=1h | rename Web.* as * | where count >= 2 | eval windowMinutes=round((lastSeen-firstSeen)/60,1) | where windowMinutes <= 60 | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | `security_content_ctime(firstSeen)` | `security_content_ctime(lastSeen)`
```

### praisonai-platform CVE-2026-47416: Bulk agent/issue/project/comment enumeration immediately after a workspace role-change PATCH

`UC_162_4` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as patchTime from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method=PATCH Web.url="*/workspaces/*/members/*" Web.status IN (200,204) by Web.src Web.user | rename Web.* as * | rename src as srcIP user as srcUser | join type=inner srcIP [ | tstats summariesonly=true count as listCount values(Web.url) as listUrls min(_time) as firstList max(_time) as lastList from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method=GET (Web.url="*/workspaces/*/agents*" OR Web.url="*/workspaces/*/issues*" OR Web.url="*/workspaces/*/projects*" OR Web.url="*/workspaces/*/comments*") by Web.src | rename Web.src as srcIP Web.* as * ] | where firstList >= patchTime AND firstList <= patchTime + 900 AND listCount >= 10 | eval delaySec = firstList - patchTime | table patchTime, firstList, delaySec, srcIP, srcUser, listCount, listUrls
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47416: praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can p

`UC_162_1` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47416: praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can p ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("deps.py","member_service.py"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("deps.py","member_service.py"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47416: praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can p
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("deps.py", "member_service.py"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("deps.py", "member_service.py"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-47416`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 5 use case(s) fired, 9 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.