# [HIGH] Typosquatted npm packages used to steal cloud and CI/CD secrets

**Source:** Microsoft Security Blog
**Published:** 2026-05-29
**Article:** https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/28/typosquatted-npm-packages-used-steal-cloud-ci-cd-secrets/

## Threat Profile

Tags 
AWS 
Linux 
npm 
Content types 
Research 
Products and services 
Microsoft Defender 
Topics 
Actionable threat insights 
Defending against advanced tactics 
Microsoft has identified an active supply chain attack targeting the npm package ecosystem. On May 28, 2026, a single threat actor operating under the newly created maintainer alias vpmdhaj (a39155771@gmail[.]com) published 14 malicious packages within a four-hour window. The packages typosquat well-known OpenSearch, ElasticSearch, Dev…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `aab.sportsontheweb.net`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1036.005** — Match Legitimate Name or Location
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1543** — Create or Modify System Process
- **T1564** — Hide Artifacts
- **T1552.005** — Cloud Instance Metadata API
- **T1555.006** — Cloud Secrets Management Stores
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### vpmdhaj typosquat npm package install via preinstall hook (node child of npm)

`UC_183_12` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.exe","node","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe") AND Processes.process IN ("*preinstall*","*postinstall*","*npm install*") AND Processes.process IN ("*@vpmdhaj*","*opensearch-setup*","*opensearch-setup-tool*","*opensearch-config-utility*","*opensearch-security-scanner*","*elastic-opensearch-helper*","*search-engine-setup*","*env-config-manager*","*devops-tools*","*search-setup*","*elastic-helper*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("node.exe", "node", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe", "npx.cmd", "npx.exe")
   or InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("preinstall", "postinstall", "npm install")
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("preinstall", "postinstall", "npm install")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (
    "@vpmdhaj", "opensearch-setup", "opensearch-setup-tool",
    "opensearch-config-utility", "opensearch-security-scanner",
    "elastic-opensearch-helper", "search-engine-setup",
    "env-config-manager", "devops-tools", "search-setup", "elastic-helper",
    "preinstall.js", "setup.mjs", "opensearch_init.js", "ai_init.js"
  )
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (
    "@vpmdhaj", "opensearch-setup", "opensearch-setup-tool",
    "opensearch-config-utility", "opensearch-security-scanner",
    "elastic-opensearch-helper", "search-engine-setup",
    "env-config-manager", "devops-tools", "search-setup", "elastic-helper"
  )
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessParentFileName, FolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### payload.bin written under node_modules by node process

`UC_183_13` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name="payload.bin" AND Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*" AND Filesystem.action="created") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName =~ "payload.bin"
| where FolderPath has "node_modules"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe", "npx.cmd", "npx.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, FileSize, SHA256,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Outbound HTTP beacon to vpmdhaj C2 (aab.sportsontheweb.net)

`UC_183_14` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.url="*aab.sportsontheweb.net*" OR Web.dest="aab.sportsontheweb.net" OR Web.http_user_agent="*X-Supply*") by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.http_method Web.http_user_agent Web.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has "aab.sportsontheweb.net"
   or RemoteUrl endswith "sportsontheweb.net"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### __DAEMONIZED=1 environment marker on spawned process

`UC_183_15` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*__DAEMONIZED=1*" OR Processes.parent_process="*__DAEMONIZED=1*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "__DAEMONIZED=1"
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "__DAEMONIZED=1"
   or AdditionalFields has "__DAEMONIZED"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Cloud metadata service hit (IMDSv2 / ECS) from node process under node_modules

`UC_183_16` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest IN ("169.254.169.254","169.254.170.2") AND All_Traffic.app="node") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.app All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteIP in ("169.254.169.254", "169.254.170.2")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node", "bun.exe", "bun")
   or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "node_modules"
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("preinstall.js", "setup.mjs", "opensearch_init.js", "ai_init.js", "payload.bin")
| summarize HitCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp),
            ParentCmds = make_set(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, 5),
            ParentPaths = make_set(InitiatingProcessFolderPath, 5)
            by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP
| order by FirstSeen desc
```

### Bun runtime download from github.com/oven-sh during npm install (Gen-2 loader)

`UC_183_17` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.url="*github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases*" AND Web.app IN ("node","node.exe","npm","npm.cmd")) by Web.src Web.user Web.dest Web.url Web.app | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has "github.com" and RemoteUrl has "oven-sh/bun"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe", "npx.cmd")
   or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("setup.mjs", "preinstall", "postinstall", "npm install", "node_modules")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Ransomware-style mass file rename / extension change

`UC_RANSOM_ENCRYPT` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, dc(Filesystem.file_name) AS files
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("modified","renamed")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, _time span=1m
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| where files > 200
| sort - files
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType in ("FileRenamed","FileModified")
| summarize files = dcount(FileName) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1m)
| where files > 200    // empirical: > 200 unique-file renames in 1m by one account on one host
                       //            is well above the P99 of legitimate bulk-tooling
| order by files desc
```

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Typosquatted npm packages used to steal cloud and CI/CD secrets

`UC_183_11` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Typosquatted npm packages used to steal cloud and CI/CD secrets ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("preinstall.js","npm.js","index.js","opensearch_init.js","ai_init.js","node.js","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe","bun.exe"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("preinstall.js","npm.js","index.js","opensearch_init.js","ai_init.js","node.js","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe","bun.exe"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Typosquatted npm packages used to steal cloud and CI/CD secrets
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("preinstall.js", "npm.js", "index.js", "opensearch_init.js", "ai_init.js", "node.js", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe", "npx.cmd", "npx.exe", "bun.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("preinstall.js", "npm.js", "index.js", "opensearch_init.js", "ai_init.js", "node.js", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe", "npx.cmd", "npx.exe", "bun.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `aab.sportsontheweb.net`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 18 use case(s) fired, 27 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.