# [CRIT] Malicious npm packages abuse dependency confusion to profile developer environments

**Source:** Microsoft Security Blog
**Published:** 2026-05-30
**Article:** https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/29/33-malicious-npm-packages-abuse-dependency-confusion-profile-developer-environments/

## Threat Profile

Tags 
npm 
Content types 
Research 
Products and services 
Microsoft Defender 
Topics 
Actionable threat insights 
Defending against advanced tactics 
Microsoft Threat Intelligence has uncovered an active supply chain attack involving malicious npm packages registered under organizational scopes that mirror real internal corporate namespaces, employing dependency confusion technique to deploy an obfuscated reconnaissance payload.
On May 28 and May 29, 2026, a threat actor operating under three m…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `oob.moika.tech`
- **Domain (defanged):** `moika.tech`
- **Domain (defanged):** `cloudplatform-single-spa.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `github.cloudplatform-single-spa.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `docs.cloudplatform-single-spa.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `jira.cloudplatform-single-spa.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `telemetry.cloudplatform-single-spa.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `t-in-one.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `npm.t-in-one.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `docs.t-in-one.io`
- **Domain (defanged):** `jira.t-in-one.io`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1195.002** — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1546.016** — Event Triggered Execution: Installer Packages
- **T1564.001** — Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### npm install of dependency-confusion scoped packages (moika.tech actor)

`UC_161_12` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.exe","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("node.exe","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe")) AND (Processes.process="*@cloudplatform-single-spa*" OR Processes.process="*@wb-track*" OR Processes.process="*@data-science/*" OR Processes.process="*@ce-rwb*" OR Processes.process="*@payments-widget*" OR Processes.process="*@travel-autotests*" OR Processes.process="*@t-in-one*" OR Processes.process="*@capibar.chat*" OR Processes.process="*@sber-ecom-core*" OR Processes.parent_process="*@cloudplatform-single-spa*" OR Processes.parent_process="*@wb-track*" OR Processes.parent_process="*@t-in-one*" OR Processes.parent_process="*@capibar.chat*" OR Processes.parent_process="*@sber-ecom-core*") by _time Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where FileName in~ ("node.exe","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe")
   or InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (
    "@cloudplatform-single-spa","@wb-track","@data-science/",
    "@ce-rwb","@payments-widget","@travel-autotests",
    "@t-in-one","@capibar.chat","@sber-ecom-core")
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (
    "@cloudplatform-single-spa","@wb-track","@data-science/",
    "@ce-rwb","@payments-widget","@travel-autotests",
    "@t-in-one","@capibar.chat","@sber-ecom-core")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### C2 callback to moika.tech payload distribution infrastructure

`UC_161_13` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web.Web where (Web.url="*oob.moika.tech*" OR Web.url="*moika.tech/payload/*" OR Web.dest="oob.moika.tech" OR Web.dest="moika.tech") by _time Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.http_user_agent Web.app | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | append [| tstats summariesonly=t count from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest="oob.moika.tech" OR All_Traffic.dest="moika.tech") by _time All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("oob.moika.tech","moika.tech")
   or RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)moika\.tech/payload/(win|mac|linux)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Malicious postinstall.js dropped under node_modules for actor scopes

`UC_161_14` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="postinstall.js" AND (Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@cloudplatform-single-spa*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@wb-track*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@data-science*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@ce-rwb*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@payments-widget*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@travel-autotests*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@t-in-one*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@capibar.chat*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*node_modules*@sber-ecom-core*") by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed","FileModified")
| where FileName =~ "postinstall.js"
| where FolderPath has "node_modules"
| where FolderPath has_any (
    "@cloudplatform-single-spa","@wb-track","@data-science",
    "@ce-rwb","@payments-widget","@travel-autotests",
    "@t-in-one","@capibar.chat","@sber-ecom-core")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, FileSize,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### node.exe spawns detached child from tmpdir after npm install (moika.tech dropper)

`UC_161_15` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="node.exe" AND (Processes.process_path="*\\Temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path="/tmp/*" OR Processes.process_path="/var/folders/*") by _time Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join type=inner dest [| tstats summariesonly=t count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="npm.cmd" OR Processes.process_name="npm.exe" OR Processes.process="*npm install*") earliest=-30m latest=+1m by Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename count as npm_count] | where npm_count > 0
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let NpmHosts = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(14d)
    | where FileName in~ ("npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd")
        or ProcessCommandLine has "npm install"
    | project DeviceId, NpmTime = Timestamp;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "node.exe"
| where FolderPath has_any (
    @"\AppData\Local\Temp\",
    @"\Windows\Temp\",
    "/tmp/",
    "/var/folders/")
| where FileName !in~ ("conhost.exe","node.exe")
| join kind=inner NpmHosts on DeviceId
| where Timestamp between (NpmTime .. NpmTime + 30m)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName,
          NpmTime, DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, NpmTime)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Ransomware-style mass file rename / extension change

`UC_RANSOM_ENCRYPT` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, dc(Filesystem.file_name) AS files
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("modified","renamed")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, _time span=1m
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| where files > 200
| sort - files
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType in ("FileRenamed","FileModified")
| summarize files = dcount(FileName) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1m)
| where files > 200    // empirical: > 200 unique-file renames in 1m by one account on one host
                       //            is well above the P99 of legitimate bulk-tooling
| order by files desc
```

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Malicious npm packages abuse dependency confusion to profile developer environme

`UC_161_11` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Malicious npm packages abuse dependency confusion to profile developer environme ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("test.js","postinstall.js","node.js","_cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js","_init.js","._cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js","._wb-track_init.js","._t-in-one_init.js","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/._cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("test.js","postinstall.js","node.js","_cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js","_init.js","._cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js","._wb-track_init.js","._t-in-one_init.js","npm.cmd","npm.exe","npx.cmd","npx.exe"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Malicious npm packages abuse dependency confusion to profile developer environme
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("test.js", "postinstall.js", "node.js", "_cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js", "_init.js", "._cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js", "._wb-track_init.js", "._t-in-one_init.js", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe", "npx.cmd", "npx.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/tmp/._cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js") or FileName in~ ("test.js", "postinstall.js", "node.js", "_cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js", "_init.js", "._cloudplatform-single-spa_init.js", "._wb-track_init.js", "._t-in-one_init.js", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe", "npx.cmd", "npx.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `oob.moika.tech`, `moika.tech`, `cloudplatform-single-spa.io`, `github.cloudplatform-single-spa.io`, `docs.cloudplatform-single-spa.io`, `jira.cloudplatform-single-spa.io`, `telemetry.cloudplatform-single-spa.io`, `t-in-one.io` _(+3 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 16 use case(s) fired, 24 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.