# [HIGH] Nx Console VS Code Extension Compromised

**Source:** StepSecurity
**Published:** 2026-06-02
**Article:** https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/nx-console-vs-code-extension-compromised

## Threat Profile

Back to Blog Threat Intel Nx Console VS Code Extension Compromised Version 18.95.0 of the popular Nx Console extension (2.2M+ installs) was published with malicious code targeting developer credentials, cloud infrastructure tokens, and CI/CD secrets. Here's what we know so far. Ashish Kurmi View LinkedIn May 18, 2026
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## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **SHA256:** `1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8`
- **SHA256:** `b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74`
- **SHA256:** `e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1048.003** — Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1543.001** — Persistence (article-specific)
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1543.001** — Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
- **T1547** — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- **T1059.006** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- **T1546** — Event Triggered Execution
- **T1552.005** — Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
- **T1078.004** — Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Nx Console v18.95.0 Malicious Payload Bootstrap via Orphan Commit (npx github:nrwl/nx#558b09d7)

`UC_146_6` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_path) as process_path values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN ("Code.exe","Code - Insiders.exe","Cursor.exe","Codium.exe","VSCodium.exe","code","cursor","codium","Code Helper","Electron")) AND (Processes.process="*github:nrwl/nx#558b09d7*" OR Processes.process="*nrwl/nx#558b09d7*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("code.exe","code - insiders.exe","cursor.exe","codium.exe","vscodium.exe","electron","code helper","code","cursor","codium")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("github:nrwl/nx#558b09d7","nrwl/nx#558b09d7","558b09d7ad0d1660e2a0fb8a06da81a6f42e06d2")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Nx Console v18.95.0 Compromised VSIX / main.js / payload SHA-256 Hash Match

`UC_146_7` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_path) as process_path values(Processes.process_hash) as process_hash from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_hash IN ("1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8","b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74","e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1") by Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | append [| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_hash IN ("1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8","b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74","e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let MaliciousHashes = dynamic([
    "1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8",
    "b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74",
    "e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1"
]);
union isfuzzy=true
    (DeviceProcessEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
        | where SHA256 in (MaliciousHashes) or InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (MaliciousHashes)
        | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Source="Process", FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine),
    (DeviceFileEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
        | where SHA256 in (MaliciousHashes)
        | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Source="FileWrite", FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine),
    (DeviceImageLoadEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
        | where SHA256 in (MaliciousHashes)
        | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Source="ImageLoad", FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### macOS LaunchAgent Persistence — com.user.kitty-monitor.plist (Nx Console Compromise)

`UC_146_8` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path="*Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.kitty-monitor.plist" OR Filesystem.file_name="com.user.kitty-monitor.plist") AND Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified","written") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where FolderPath has "/Library/LaunchAgents/" or FolderPath has @"\Library\LaunchAgents\"
| where FileName =~ "com.user.kitty-monitor.plist" or FolderPath endswith "com.user.kitty-monitor.plist"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Kitty cat.py Python Backdoor File Drop / Execution (Nx Console Compromise)

`UC_146_9` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.process_name) as creator from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="*/.local/share/kitty/cat.py" OR Filesystem.file_path="/tmp/kitty-*" by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | append [| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("python","python3","python2") AND (Processes.process="*/.local/share/kitty/cat.py*" OR Processes.process="*/kitty/cat.py*" OR Processes.process="*/tmp/kitty-*") by Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
union
  (DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
    | where (FolderPath has "/.local/share/kitty/" and FileName =~ "cat.py")
         or FolderPath matches regex @"^/tmp/kitty-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]+/"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Source="FileWrite", ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256),
  (DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where FileName has_any ("python","python3","python2") or InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("python","python3","python2")
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (".local/share/kitty/cat.py","/kitty/cat.py","/tmp/kitty-")
         or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".local/share/kitty/cat.py","/kitty/cat.py","/tmp/kitty-")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Source="Exec", ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine=ProcessCommandLine, SHA256)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### AWS IMDS (169.254.169.254) Hit from Developer / Non-EC2 Endpoint (Nx Console Credential Theft)

`UC_146_10` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.src) as src values(All_Traffic.src_ip) as src_ip values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.process_name) as process_name values(All_Traffic.user) as user from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_ip="169.254.169.254" AND All_Traffic.dest_port IN (80,443,8080) NOT (All_Traffic.src_category IN ("aws-ec2","aws_instance","ec2")) by All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | where count > 0 | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let DevEndpoints = DeviceInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceCategory, OSPlatform, DeviceType, IsInternetFacing) by DeviceId, DeviceName
    | where DeviceCategory != "Server" or isempty(DeviceCategory);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteIP == "169.254.169.254"
| where RemotePort in (80,443,8080)
| join kind=inner DevEndpoints on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, OSPlatform, DeviceCategory, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### DNS tunneling / TXT-heavy domain queries

`UC_DNS_TUNNEL` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS
    where DNS.message_type="QUERY"
    by DNS.src, DNS.query
| `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`
| eval qlen=len(query)
| where qlen > 50
| rex field=query "(?<second_level_domain>[\w-]+\.[\w-]+)$"
| stats sum(count) AS qcount, dc(query) AS unique_subs, max(qlen) AS max_label
    by src, second_level_domain
| where qcount > 100 AND unique_subs > 20
| sort - qcount
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemotePort == 53 and isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| extend qlen = strlen(RemoteUrl)
| where qlen > 50
| extend SecondLevelDomain = extract(@"([\w-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,})$", 1, RemoteUrl)
| summarize qcount = count(), uniqueSubs = dcount(RemoteUrl), maxLabel = max(qlen)
    by DeviceName, SecondLevelDomain
| where qcount > 100 and uniqueSubs > 20
| order by qcount desc
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Nx Console VS Code Extension Compromised

`UC_146_5` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Nx Console VS Code Extension Compromised ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("main.js","cat.py","index.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.kitty-monitor.plist*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/kitty-*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("main.js","cat.py","index.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Nx Console VS Code Extension Compromised
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("main.js", "cat.py", "index.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.kitty-monitor.plist", "/tmp/kitty-") or FileName in~ ("main.js", "cat.py", "index.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `1a4afce34918bdc74ae3f31edaffffaa0ee074d83618f53edfd88137927340b8`, `b0cefb66b953e5184b6adb3035e9e267335ac5eabfe1848e07834777b9397b74`, `e7347d90653efc565f03733a95e9209d78f9cfa81e31ff2b2dd9d48d75a4b8b1`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 11 use case(s) fired, 15 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.