# [HIGH] Reporting from Vegas: Networking, AI, and good boys

**Source:** Cisco Talos
**Published:** 2026-06-04
**Article:** https://blog.talosintelligence.com/reporting-from-vegas-networking-ai-and-good-boys/

## Threat Profile

Reporting from Vegas: Networking, AI, and good boys 
By 
Joe Marshall 
Thursday, June 4, 2026 14:00
Threat Source newsletter
Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 
Howdy friends, and hello from Cisco Live U.S., here in sunny (and very hot) Las Vegas!  
An interesting quirk of being sent to one of these events is you learn to understand your limits as a person. Cisco Live is a three-day event, and it encompasses so many people, partners, workshops, CTFs (!!), and symposi…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `144.31.221.82`
- **Domain (defanged):** `kongtuke.com`
- **SHA256:** `9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507`
- **SHA256:** `9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f`
- **SHA256:** `c0ad494457dcd9e964378760fb6aca86a23622045bca851d8f3ab49ec33978fe`
- **SHA256:** `afc8a00883a4ea07df2dc1d4ed02f8a23b35c9456413b438a2d9ce3ae5076638`
- **SHA256:** `a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91`
- **MD5:** `2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f`
- **MD5:** `38de5b216c33833af710e88f7f64fc98`
- **MD5:** `bf9672ec85283fdf002d83662f0b08b7`
- **MD5:** `cc4d231df34e57f59eb970353c7d9de2`
- **MD5:** `7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1496** — Resource Hijacking
- **T1588.001** — Obtain Capabilities: Malware

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Talos weekly prevalent malware SHA256 IOC sweep (Coinminer / Procpatcher / KMS activator)

`UC_126_8` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_hash IN ("9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507","9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f","c0ad494457dcd9e964378760fb6aca86a23622045bca851d8f3ab49ec33978fe","afc8a00883a4ea07df2dc1d4ed02f8a23b35c9456413b438a2d9ce3ae5076638","a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_hash Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | append [| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_hash IN ("9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507","9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f","c0ad494457dcd9e964378760fb6aca86a23622045bca851d8f3ab49ec33978fe","afc8a00883a4ea07df2dc1d4ed02f8a23b35c9456413b438a2d9ce3ae5076638","a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`] | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime) | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let TalosMalwareHashes = dynamic(["9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507","9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f","c0ad494457dcd9e964378760fb6aca86a23622045bca851d8f3ab49ec33978fe","afc8a00883a4ea07df2dc1d4ed02f8a23b35c9456413b438a2d9ce3ae5076638","a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91"]);
let ProcHits = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where SHA256 in (TalosMalwareHashes)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256,
              ParentFileName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
              Source = "DeviceProcessEvents";
let FileHits = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where SHA256 in (TalosMalwareHashes)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, FolderPath,
              ProcessCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256,
              ParentFileName = InitiatingProcessParentFileName, ParentCmd = "",
              Source = "DeviceFileEvents";
union ProcHits, FileHits
| extend TalosDetection = case(
    SHA256 == "9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507", "Win.Worm.Coinminer (VID001.exe)",
    SHA256 == "9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f", "Win.Tool.Procpatcher (sample.exe)",
    SHA256 == "c0ad494457dcd9e964378760fb6aca86a23622045bca851d8f3ab49ec33978fe", "W32.C0AD494457-95.SBX.TG (f_000b97.html)",
    SHA256 == "afc8a00883a4ea07df2dc1d4ed02f8a23b35c9456413b438a2d9ce3ae5076638", "PUA.Win.Tool.Kmsactivator (AutoPico.exe)",
    SHA256 == "a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91", "Talos prevalent (unspecified)",
    "Unknown")
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Reporting from Vegas: Networking, AI, and good boys

`UC_126_7` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Reporting from Vegas: Networking, AI, and good boys ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("vid001.exe","sample.exe","autopico.exe","d4aa3e7010220ad1b458fac17039c274_62_exe.exe"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("vid001.exe","sample.exe","autopico.exe","d4aa3e7010220ad1b458fac17039c274_62_exe.exe"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Reporting from Vegas: Networking, AI, and good boys
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("vid001.exe", "sample.exe", "autopico.exe", "d4aa3e7010220ad1b458fac17039c274_62_exe.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("vid001.exe", "sample.exe", "autopico.exe", "d4aa3e7010220ad1b458fac17039c274_62_exe.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `144.31.221.82`, `kongtuke.com`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507`, `9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f`, `c0ad494457dcd9e964378760fb6aca86a23622045bca851d8f3ab49ec33978fe`, `afc8a00883a4ea07df2dc1d4ed02f8a23b35c9456413b438a2d9ce3ae5076638`, `a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91`, `2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f`, `38de5b216c33833af710e88f7f64fc98`, `bf9672ec85283fdf002d83662f0b08b7` _(+2 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 9 use case(s) fired, 15 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.