# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47669: DbGate: Zip Slip in archive/unzip allows arbitrary file write leading to RCE

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-06-05
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h535-j5hr-mv56

## Threat Profile

DbGate: Zip Slip in archive/unzip allows arbitrary file write leading to RCE

The `unzipDirectory()` function in `packages/api/src/shell/unzipDirectory.js` (line 27) does not validate that extracted file paths stay within the output directory. A malicious ZIP with `../` entries writes files anywhere on the filesystem.

In the default Docker deployment, DbGate runs as root and the `none` auth provider issues JWT tokens without credentials via `POST /auth/login`, so this is exploitable by any netw…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-47669`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1053.003** — Scheduled Task/Job: Cron
- **T1505.003** — Server Software Component: Web Shell
- **T1078** — Valid Accounts

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### DbGate Zip Slip (CVE-2026-47669): node process writes outside archive dir to OS-sensitive paths

`UC_119_2` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.process_name="node" AND (Filesystem.file_path="/etc/cron.d/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/cron.daily/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/cron.hourly/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/cron.weekly/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/cron.monthly/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/var/spool/cron/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/sudoers.d/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/root/.ssh/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/ld.so.preload" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/init.d/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/profile.d/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/usr/local/bin/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/usr/local/sbin/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="/etc/systemd/system/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.process_path Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// CVE-2026-47669 DbGate Zip Slip - node process writes outside archive dir
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "node"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("dbgate", "packages/api", "/app/packages")
| where FolderPath startswith "/etc/cron." 
    or FolderPath startswith "/var/spool/cron/"
    or FolderPath startswith "/etc/sudoers.d/"
    or FolderPath startswith "/root/.ssh/"
    or FolderPath startswith "/etc/init.d/"
    or FolderPath startswith "/etc/profile.d/"
    or FolderPath startswith "/etc/systemd/system/"
    or FolderPath startswith "/usr/local/bin/"
    or FolderPath startswith "/usr/local/sbin/"
    or FolderPath == "/etc/ld.so.preload"
    or FolderPath == "/etc/passwd"
    or FolderPath == "/etc/shadow"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
          InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### DbGate exploit chain: anonymous /auth/login + /api/archive/unzip POSTs from same source (CVE-2026-47669)

`UC_119_3` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(Web.url) as urlsHit values(Web.http_user_agent) as user_agents dc(Web.url) as distinct_endpoints from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method=POST AND (Web.url="*/api/archive/unzip" OR Web.url="*/api/archive/save-uploaded-zip" OR Web.url="*/api/uploads/upload" OR Web.url="*/api/auth/login") by Web.src Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | where distinct_endpoints >= 2 AND (mvfind(urlsHit,"/api/archive/unzip")>=0 OR mvfind(urlsHit,"/api/archive/save-uploaded-zip")>=0) | convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen) | sort - count
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47669: DbGate: Zip Slip in archive/unzip allows arbit

`UC_119_1` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47669: DbGate: Zip Slip in archive/unzip allows arbit ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/cron.d/dbgate-pwn*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/pwned*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/cron.d/*")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47669: DbGate: Zip Slip in archive/unzip allows arbit
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/etc/cron.d/dbgate-pwn", "/tmp/pwned", "/etc/cron.d/"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-47669`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 4 use case(s) fired, 5 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.