# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47670: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via loadReader functionName code injection in DbGate

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-06-05
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm5r-5qp3-5vxf

## Threat Profile

Authenticated Remote Code Execution via loadReader functionName code injection in DbGate

### Summary

DbGate is vulnerable to authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE). Any user with valid DbGate credentials can execute arbitrary OS commands as root by exploiting an unsanitized `functionName` parameter in the `/runners/load-reader` endpoint. The `require = null` mitigation is trivially bypassed via dynamic `import()`.


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### Details

**Code injection via `functionName` in loadReader**

Th…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-47670`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1059.004** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- **T1059.003** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### DbGate loadReader functionName code injection (CVE-2026-47670)

`UC_118_2` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Web.url) as url values(Web.src) as src values(Web.user) as user from datamodel=Web.Web where Web.http_method=POST Web.uri_path="*/runners/load-reader" (Web.http_user_agent=* OR Web.url=*) by Web.dest Web.uri_path Web.src Web.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | search url="*child_process*" OR url="*import(*" OR url="*execSync*" OR url="*\nvar*" OR url="*%0Avar*" OR url="*%0Aawait*" | rename firstTime as earliest lastTime as latest | convert ctime(earliest) ctime(latest)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has "/runners/load-reader" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "/runners/load-reader"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### DbGate node process spawning shell child (post-exploit RCE)

`UC_118_3` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=node OR Processes.parent_process_name=node.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=dbgate OR Processes.parent_process_path="*dbgate*") (Processes.process_name=sh OR Processes.process_name=bash OR Processes.process_name=dash OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=pwsh OR Processes.process_name=busybox) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename firstTime as earliest lastTime as latest | convert ctime(earliest) ctime(latest)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node","node.exe","dbgate","dbgate.exe")
   or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("/app/packages/api", "/dbgate", "dbgate")
| where FileName in~ ("sh","bash","dash","zsh","ash","busybox","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh","pwsh.exe")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessIntegrityLevel
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47670: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via loadRe

`UC_118_1` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47670: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via loadRe ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("poc.py","bundle.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/usr/bin/env*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/_rce_*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/shadow*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/root/.dbgate*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("poc.py","bundle.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47670: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via loadRe
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("poc.py", "bundle.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/usr/bin/env", "/tmp/_rce_", "/etc/shadow", "/root/.dbgate") or FileName in~ ("poc.py", "bundle.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-47670`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 4 use case(s) fired, 5 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.