# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47252: Anyquery: AppleScript/JXA Code Injection via Unescaped URL in macOS Chrome Plugin

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-06-08
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hrj8-hjv8-mgwc

## Threat Profile

Anyquery: AppleScript/JXA Code Injection via Unescaped URL in macOS Chrome Plugin

# AppleScript/JXA Code Injection via Unescaped URL in macOS Chrome Plugin

| Field            | Value |
| ---------------- | ----- |
| Repository       | julien040/anyquery |
| Affected version | 0.4.4 (commit 0abd460) |
| Vulnerability    | CWE-94 — Improper Control of Generation of Code |
| Severity         | High |

## Summary

The `chrome_tabs` plugin (and equivalent Brave/Edge/Safari variants) interpolates a …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-47252`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.002** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### osascript invoked with AppleScript breakout pattern (mismatched tell blocks + do shell script)

`UC_97_2` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=osascript Processes.process="*do shell script*" Processes.process="*end tell*" Processes.process="*tell application*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where like(process, "%tell application%tell application%") OR match(parent_process_name, "(?i)anyquery") OR match(parent_process, "(?i)anyquery") | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where DeviceInfo_OSPlatform == "macOS" or FolderPath has "/usr/bin/osascript"
| where FileName =~ "osascript"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "do shell script"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "end tell"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "tell application"
| extend TellOpeners = countof(tolower(ProcessCommandLine), "tell application")
| where TellOpeners >= 2
   or InitiatingProcessFileName has "anyquery"
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "anyquery"
   or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "anyquery"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, ProcessId
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47252: Anyquery: AppleScript/JXA Code Injection via U

`UC_97_1` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47252: Anyquery: AppleScript/JXA Code Injection via U ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("seturl.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("seturl.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-47252: Anyquery: AppleScript/JXA Code Injection via U
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("seturl.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("seturl.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-47252`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 3 use case(s) fired, 3 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.