# [CRIT] UNC3753 Used Vishing and Physical Intrusions in U.S. Data Theft Extortion Campaign

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-08
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/unc3753-used-vishing-and-physical.html

## Threat Profile

UNC3753 Used Vishing and Physical Intrusions in U.S. Data Theft Extortion Campaign 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 08, 2026 Social Engineering / Cyber Crime 
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a financially motivated data theft extortion campaign that has targeted dozens of organizations across professional, legal, and financial services in the U.S. between January and May 2026.
The activity has been attributed by Google Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) to a threat…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `192.236.147.131`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `192.236.147.138`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `193.141.60.212`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `192.236.154.158`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `192.236.146.173`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `174.169.162.62`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `64.94.84.97`
- **Domain (defanged):** `business-data-leaks.com`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1566.004** — Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
- **T1566** — Phishing
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1102** — Web Service
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1567** — Exfiltration Over Web Service
- **T1048** — Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- **T1052.001** — Exfiltration Over Physical Medium: Exfiltration over USB
- **T1200** — Hardware Additions
- **T1657** — Financial Theft

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Quick Assist launched followed by remote interactive session (UNC3753 vishing pretext)

`UC_108_11` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="quickassist.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name="quickassist.exe" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where firstTime > relative_time(now(), "-7d@d")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName =~ "quickassist.exe" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "quickassist.exe"
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### AnyDesk, Bomgar, SuperOps or Zoho Assist installer execution (UNC3753 RMM foothold)

`UC_108_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","BomgarPortal.exe","bomgar-scc.exe","SuperOps.RMM.Agent.exe","ZohoMeeting.exe","ZA_Connect.exe") OR Processes.process IN ("*AnyDesk*","*Bomgar*","*SuperOps*","*ZohoAssist*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where firstTime > relative_time(now(), "-7d@d")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let RMMBinaries = dynamic(["anydesk.exe","bomgar-scc.exe","bomgarportal.exe","bomgar.exe","superops.rmm.agent.exe","superops_agent.exe","zohoassist.exe","zohomeeting.exe","za_connect.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ (RMMBinaries)
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("AnyDesk","Bomgar","SuperOps","Zoho Assist")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Privnote[.]com self-destructing-note URL access from corporate endpoint

`UC_108_13` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web.Web where Web.url="*privnote.com*" OR Web.dest="privnote.com" by Web.src Web.user Web.url Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | where firstTime > relative_time(now(), "-7d@d")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has "privnote.com"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("msmpeng.exe","mssense.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Outbound connection to UNC3753 (Luna Moth) infrastructure IPs

`UC_108_14` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest IN ("192.236.147.131","192.236.147.138","193.141.60.212","192.236.154.158","192.236.146.173","174.169.162.62","64.94.84.97") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | where firstTime > relative_time(now(), "-30d@d")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let UNC3753_IPs = dynamic(["192.236.147.131","192.236.147.138","193.141.60.212","192.236.154.158","192.236.146.173","174.169.162.62","64.94.84.97"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP in (UNC3753_IPs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### WinSCP or Rclone exfiltration from end-user workstations

`UC_108_15` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("winscp.exe","winscp.com","rclone.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where firstTime > relative_time(now(), "-7d@d") | search NOT (user IN ("backupsvc","sysadmin*","sftpsvc"))
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("winscp.exe","winscp.com","rclone.exe")
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("rclone copy","rclone sync","rclone copyto","winscp.com /command","open sftp://","open ftps://")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where not (InitiatingProcessAccountName has_any ("backupsvc","sftpsvc"))
| where not (DeviceName has_any ("backup","jumpbox","bastion"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### USB mass-storage attached followed by bulk file copy (UNC3753 physical intrusion)

`UC_108_16` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action="created" AND Filesystem.file_path IN ("E:\\*","F:\\*","G:\\*","H:\\*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where count > 50 AND firstTime > relative_time(now(), "-7d@d")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let USBAttach = DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where ActionType in ("UsbDriveMounted","PnpDeviceConnected","UsbDriveDriveLetterChanged")
    | project AttachTime=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, AdditionalFields;
let BulkCopy = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
    | where FolderPath matches regex @"^[D-Z]:\\"
    | summarize FileCount = count(), FirstWrite=min(Timestamp), LastWrite=max(Timestamp), SampleFile=any(FolderPath) by DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
    | where FileCount > 50;
USBAttach
| join kind=inner BulkCopy on DeviceId
| where FirstWrite between (AttachTime .. AttachTime + 30m)
| project AttachTime, FirstWrite, LastWrite, DeviceName, AccountName, FileCount, SampleFile, AdditionalFields
| order by AttachTime desc
```

### Outbound mail to or domain lookup of business-data-leaks[.]com (UNC3753 extortion infrastructure)

`UC_108_17` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where DNS.query="*business-data-leaks.com*" by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | where firstTime > relative_time(now(), "-30d@d")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
union
(DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where RemoteUrl has "business-data-leaks.com" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Source="DeviceNetworkEvents", InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP),
(EmailEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where SenderFromAddress has "business-data-leaks.com" or SenderMailFromDomain has "business-data-leaks.com" | project Timestamp, DeviceName="", Source="EmailEvents", InitiatingProcessAccountName=RecipientEmailAddress, InitiatingProcessFileName=Subject, RemoteUrl=SenderFromAddress, RemoteIP="")
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Microsoft Teams external-tenant chat from unverified IT-helpdesk impersonator

`UC_TEAMS_VISHING` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
`o365_management_activity`
  Workload=MicrosoftTeams Operation=MessageSent
  ExternalParticipants=*
| where match(SenderDisplayName, "(?i)(help.?desk|it.?support|service.?desk|tech.?support|admin)")
| stats count, earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime
    by SenderUpn, SenderDisplayName, RecipientUpn, ChatId
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where Application == "Microsoft Teams"
| where ActionType == "MessageSent"
| where RawEventData has "ExternalParticipants"
| extend SenderDisplayName = tostring(parse_json(RawEventData).SenderDisplayName)
| where SenderDisplayName matches regex @"(?i)(help.?desk|it.?support|service.?desk|tech.?support|admin)"
| project Timestamp, AccountDisplayName, IPAddress, ActivityType, SenderDisplayName, RawEventData
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Ransomware-style mass file rename / extension change

`UC_RANSOM_ENCRYPT` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, dc(Filesystem.file_name) AS files
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("modified","renamed")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, _time span=1m
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| where files > 200
| sort - files
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType in ("FileRenamed","FileModified")
| summarize files = dcount(FileName) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1m)
| where files > 200    // empirical: > 200 unique-file renames in 1m by one account on one host
                       //            is well above the P99 of legitimate bulk-tooling
| order by files desc
```

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `192.236.147.131`, `192.236.147.138`, `193.141.60.212`, `192.236.154.158`, `192.236.146.173`, `174.169.162.62`, `64.94.84.97`, `business-data-leaks.com`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 18 use case(s) fired, 27 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.