# [HIGH] Meta to Use Off-Site Business Data for Feed and AI Personalization **Source:** The Hacker News **Published:** 2026-06-09 **Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/meta-to-use-off-site-business-data-for.html ## Threat Profile Meta to Use Off-Site Business Data for Feed and AI Personalization  Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 09, 2026 Privacy / Artificial Intelligence Meta on Tuesday announced that it will use information shared by other businesses to personalize users' feed and responses from its artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot, expanding its scope beyond targeted ads. "Businesses often share information about people's activity on their sites with us to make ads more relevant," Meta said in a statement. "We already use… ## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only) - _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run. ## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques - **T1071.001** — Web Protocols - **T1071.004** — DNS - **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token - **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials - **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link - **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link - **T1059.001** — PowerShell - **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste - **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain ## Kill chain phases observed _(none detected from narrative keywords)_ ## Recommended hunts ### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations `UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl | tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal" by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest | eval delta = _time - prev_time | stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest | where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600 | sort - count ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(1d) | where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess" | project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp | sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc | extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1), prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1) | where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port | extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts) | summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec) by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort | where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0 | order by conn_count desc ``` ### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant `UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl | tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication where Authentication.action="success" AND Authentication.signature IN ( "Consent to application", "Add app role assignment grant to user", "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant", "Add delegated permission grant") by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql CloudAppEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.") | project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType, ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent ``` ### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution `UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl ``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ``` | tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time from datamodel=Web where Web.action="allowed" by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url | join type=inner recipient [| tstats `summariesonly` count from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-" by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | rex field=url "https?://(?[^/]+)" | rename recipient AS recipient] | join type=inner src [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe", "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe", "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe", "curl.exe","wget.exe") by Processes.dest, Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename dest AS src] | eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time | where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60 | table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject, clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd | sort - click_time ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql // Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s. // Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks // never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the // 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable. let LookbackDays = 7d; let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays) | where AccountName !endswith "$" | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough") | join kind=inner ( EmailEvents | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays) | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered" | where EmailDirection == "Inbound" | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp ) on NetworkMessageId | join kind=leftouter ( EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain ) on NetworkMessageId, Url | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, ActionType; // Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on // the recipient's device. DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays) | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe", "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe") | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe", "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe") | join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn | where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s) | project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp, DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime), DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress, Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName | order by ClickTime desc ``` ### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha) `UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl | tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe") AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*" OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*" OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where AccountName !endswith "$" | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe") | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe") | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine ``` ### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children `UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium** **Splunk SPL (CIM):** ```spl | tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe") AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` ``` **Defender KQL:** ```kql DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where AccountName !endswith "$" | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe") | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine ``` ## Why this matters Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: 5 use case(s) fired, 9 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.