# [CRIT] WinRAR Flaw Exploited by Russia-Aligned Groups to Deploy Stealers in Ukraine

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-09
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/winrar-flaw-exploited-by-russia-aligned.html

## Threat Profile

WinRAR Flaw Exploited by Russia-Aligned Groups to Deploy Stealers in Ukraine 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 09, 2026 Vulnerability / Cyber Espionage 
Two Russia-aligned cyber attack campaigns have continued to exploit a security flaw in WinRAR to target Ukrainian organisations, almost a year after patches for the vulnerability were released.
The activity has been attributed by Trend Micro to Earth Dahu (aka Gamaredon) and SHADOW-EARTH-066 (aka UAC-0226). It involves the exploitation of CVE-2025-8088 …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2025-8088`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `172.86.76.132`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `144.172.88.24`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `172.86.72.243`
- **Domain (defanged):** `snterval.selltosell.ru`
- **Domain (defanged):** `dayobtvoyu.ru`
- **Domain (defanged):** `sweet.csxvl00328.workers.dev`
- **Domain (defanged):** `vids-road-christina-guards.trycloudflare.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `insight-sweet-drainage-appreciated.trycloudflare.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `e097.yggjf81487.workers.dev`
- **Domain (defanged):** `csxvl00328.workers.dev`
- **SHA256:** `272c86c6db95f1ef8b83f672b65e64df16494cae261e1aba1aeb1e59dcb68524`
- **SHA256:** `defe25e400d4925d8a2bb4b1181044d06a8bf61688fd9c9ea59f1e0bb7bc21d8`
- **SHA256:** `edc1f7528ca93ec432daca820f47e08d218b79cceca1ee764966f8f90d6a58bd`
- **SHA256:** `ba86b6e0199b8907427364246f049efd67dc4eda0b5078f4bc7607253634cf24`
- **SHA256:** `aea13e5871b683a19a05015ff0369b412b985d47eb67a3af93f44400a026b4b0`
- **SHA256:** `b53069a380a9dd3dc1c758888d0e50dd43935f16df0f7124c77569375a9f44f5`
- **SHA256:** `33580073680016f23bf474e6e62c61bf6a776e561385bfb06788a4713114ba9d`
- **SHA256:** `498961237cf1c48f1e7764829818c5ba0af24a234c2f29c4420fb80276aec676`
- **SHA256:** `4f4567abe9ff520797b04b04255bbbe07ecdddb594559d436ac53314ec62c1b3`
- **SHA256:** `53f1b841d323c211c715b8f80d0efb9529440caae921a60340de027052946dd9`
- **MD5:** `bf94f4056627907d86ce1cae8b44c67a`
- **MD5:** `a2c6e01001c62f6198e31a9d603977c6`
- **MD5:** `d2a6009587b3cb73355c2d1e53d5cdfa`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1547.001** — Persistence (article-specific)
- **T1547.001** — Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- **T1574.005** — Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
- **T1620** — Reflective Code Loading
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1102** — Web Service
- **T1572** — Protocol Tunneling
- **T1218.005** — Mshta
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1568.001** — Fast Flux DNS / Dead Drop Resolvers

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### WinRAR CVE-2025-8088 — archive tool writes payload to user Startup folder

`UC_86_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.process_name IN ("WinRAR.exe","Rar.exe","UnRAR.exe","7zG.exe","Bandizip.exe") AND Filesystem.file_path="*\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*" AND (Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk" OR Filesystem.file_name="*.exe" OR Filesystem.file_name="*.dll" OR Filesystem.file_name="*.vbs" OR Filesystem.file_name="*.bat" OR Filesystem.file_name="*.hta" OR Filesystem.file_name="*.cmd" OR Filesystem.file_name="*.ps1") by host Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in~ ("FileCreated","FileRenamed","FileModified")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("WinRAR.exe","Rar.exe","UnRAR.exe","7zG.exe","Bandizip.exe")
| where FolderPath has @"\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
| where FileName endswith ".lnk" or FileName endswith ".exe" or FileName endswith ".dll" or FileName endswith ".bat" or FileName endswith ".vbs" or FileName endswith ".hta" or FileName endswith ".cmd" or FileName endswith ".ps1"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Startup LNK spawns cmd.exe → PowerShell in-memory DLL loader (GIFTEDCROOK chain)

`UC_86_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="cmd.exe" AND (Processes.parent_process="*\\Startup\\*" OR Processes.parent_process="*\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup*" OR Processes.parent_process="*.lnk*") AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe") AND (Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*Reflection.Assembly*" OR Processes.process="*::Load(*" OR Processes.process="*IEX*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*" OR Processes.process="*hidden*" OR Processes.process="*-enc*") by host Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (@"\Startup\", @"\Start Menu\Programs\Startup", ".lnk")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("FromBase64String","IEX","Invoke-Expression","DownloadString","Reflection.Assembly","[Reflection.Assembly]","::Load(","-nop","-w hidden","-windowstyle hidden","-enc","result.dll")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ChildCmd = ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### GIFTEDCROOK browser credential and cookie theft — non-browser process reads Chromium/Firefox stores

`UC_86_13` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path="*\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\Opera Software\\Opera Stable\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\User Data\\*") AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("Login Data","Cookies","Web Data","key4.db","logins.json","cookies.sqlite","places.sqlite")) AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","opera.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","explorer.exe","MsMpEng.exe","SearchIndexer.exe","backgroundTaskHost.exe") by host Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.process Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Opera Software\Opera Stable\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\", @"\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","Web Data","key4.db","logins.json","cookies.sqlite","places.sqlite")
| where not (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","opera.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","explorer.exe","MsMpEng.exe","SearchIndexer.exe","backgroundTaskHost.exe"))
| where not (InitiatingProcessAccountName endswith "$")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### GIFTEDCROOK / Gamaredon C2 callback to article IOCs (IPs + workers.dev / trycloudflare / .ru domains)

`UC_86_14` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
`network_traffic` (dest IN ("172.86.76.132","144.172.88.24","172.86.72.243") OR query IN ("snterval.selltosell.ru","dayobtvoyu.ru","sweet.csxvl00328.workers.dev","csxvl00328.workers.dev","e097.yggjf81487.workers.dev","vids-road-christina-guards.trycloudflare.com","insight-sweet-drainage-appreciated.trycloudflare.com") OR url IN ("*snterval.selltosell.ru*","*dayobtvoyu.ru*","*csxvl00328.workers.dev*","*yggjf81487.workers.dev*","*vids-road-christina-guards.trycloudflare.com*","*insight-sweet-drainage-appreciated.trycloudflare.com*")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.dest) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(All_Traffic.app) as app count by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.user | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let bad_domains = dynamic(["snterval.selltosell.ru","dayobtvoyu.ru","sweet.csxvl00328.workers.dev","csxvl00328.workers.dev","e097.yggjf81487.workers.dev","vids-road-christina-guards.trycloudflare.com","insight-sweet-drainage-appreciated.trycloudflare.com"]);
let bad_ips = dynamic(["172.86.76.132","144.172.88.24","172.86.72.243"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (bad_domains) or RemoteIP in (bad_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Earth Dahu / Gamaredon HTA-to-VBScript chain (mshta.exe spawning wscript/cscript)

`UC_86_15` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="mshta.exe" AND Processes.process_name IN ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe") by host Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_hash Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(parent_process,"(?i)\.(hta|html?)|https?://|javascript:|vbscript:")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "mshta.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".hta","http://","https://","javascript:","vbscript:")
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any (".vbs",".vbe",".js",".jse","GetObject(","WScript.Shell","MSXML2.XMLHTTP","WinHttp.WinHttpRequest")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ParentImage = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ChildImage = FolderPath, ChildCmd = ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — WinRAR Flaw Exploited by Russia-Aligned Groups to Deploy Stealers in Ukraine

`UC_86_10` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — WinRAR Flaw Exploited by Russia-Aligned Groups to Deploy Stealers in Ukraine ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("result.dll"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("result.dll"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — WinRAR Flaw Exploited by Russia-Aligned Groups to Deploy Stealers in Ukraine
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("result.dll"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("result.dll"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `172.86.76.132`, `144.172.88.24`, `172.86.72.243`, `snterval.selltosell.ru`, `dayobtvoyu.ru`, `sweet.csxvl00328.workers.dev`, `vids-road-christina-guards.trycloudflare.com`, `insight-sweet-drainage-appreciated.trycloudflare.com` _(+2 more)_

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2025-8088`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `272c86c6db95f1ef8b83f672b65e64df16494cae261e1aba1aeb1e59dcb68524`, `defe25e400d4925d8a2bb4b1181044d06a8bf61688fd9c9ea59f1e0bb7bc21d8`, `edc1f7528ca93ec432daca820f47e08d218b79cceca1ee764966f8f90d6a58bd`, `ba86b6e0199b8907427364246f049efd67dc4eda0b5078f4bc7607253634cf24`, `aea13e5871b683a19a05015ff0369b412b985d47eb67a3af93f44400a026b4b0`, `b53069a380a9dd3dc1c758888d0e50dd43935f16df0f7124c77569375a9f44f5`, `33580073680016f23bf474e6e62c61bf6a776e561385bfb06788a4713114ba9d`, `498961237cf1c48f1e7764829818c5ba0af24a234c2f29c4420fb80276aec676` _(+5 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 16 use case(s) fired, 26 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.