# [HIGH] Code is being written everywhere, and the device is the only constant

**Source:** Aikido
**Published:** 2026-06-10
**Article:** https://www.aikido.dev/blog/code-is-written-everywhere

## Threat Profile

Blog News Code is being written everywhere, and the device is the only constant Code is being written everywhere, and the device is the only constant Written by Nicholas Thomson Published on: Jun 10, 2026 This post is based on Mackenzie's conversation with James Hawkins on The Secure Disclosure podcast . Listen to the full episode or watch below. 
PostHog's engineering team is merging roughly as many pull requests through Slack as through their code editor. As James Hawkins, co-founder and co-CE…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `142.11.206.73`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `45.32.150.251`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `45.32.151.157`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `70.34.242.255`
- **Domain (defanged):** `giftshop.club`
- **Domain (defanged):** `sfrclak.com`
- **SHA1:** `2553649f2322049666871cea80a5d0d6adc700ca`
- **SHA1:** `d6f3f62fd3b9f5432f5782b62d8cfd5247d5ee71`
- **SHA1:** `07d889e2dadce6f3910dcbc253317d28ca61c766`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `142.11.206.73`, `45.32.150.251`, `45.32.151.157`, `70.34.242.255`, `giftshop.club`, `sfrclak.com`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `2553649f2322049666871cea80a5d0d6adc700ca`, `d6f3f62fd3b9f5432f5782b62d8cfd5247d5ee71`, `07d889e2dadce6f3910dcbc253317d28ca61c766`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 3 use case(s) fired, 3 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.