# [HIGH] AI Broke Vulnerability Management. That's Why CISOs Are Moving Budget to BAS.

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-11
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/ai-broke-vulnerability-management-thats.html

## Threat Profile

AI Broke Vulnerability Management. That's Why CISOs Are Moving Budget to BAS. 
 The Hacker News  Jun 11, 2026 Artificial Intelligence / Threat Intelligence 
For thirty years, vulnerability management ran on a buffer: the months between when a vulnerability was found and when someone could figure out how to weaponize it. The solution was straightforward enough; triage by severity, schedule the fix, validate, and move on. The buffer was what made that work.
Today, that buffer is gone.
AI didn't …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `zerodayclock.com`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1110.001** — Password Guessing
- **T1110.003** — Password Spraying
- **T1110.004** — Credential Stuffing
- **T1133** — External Remote Services
- **T1078** — Valid Accounts
- **T1059** — Command and Scripting Interpreter
- **T1106** — Native API
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1102.002** — Web Service: Bidirectional Communication

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### FortiGate SSL-VPN / admin credential brute-force or spray from single source

`UC_51_6` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, dc(Authentication.user) as distinct_users, dc(Authentication.dest) as distinct_dests, values(Authentication.user) as users, values(Authentication.dest) as dests from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure (Authentication.app=fortigate OR Authentication.app=sslvpn OR Authentication.app="FortiGate") by Authentication.src _time span=10m | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | where distinct_users>=10 OR distinct_dests>=10 OR count>=100 | join type=left src [| tstats `summariesonly` count as success_count, values(Authentication.user) as success_users, values(Authentication.dest) as success_dests from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success (Authentication.app=fortigate OR Authentication.app=sslvpn) by Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`] | where isnotnull(success_count) | table _time src users dests distinct_users distinct_dests count success_count success_users success_dests
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let WindowMin = 10m;
let FailedThreshold = 10;
let Failures = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(1d)
    | where RemotePort in (443, 10443, 8443) and InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("sslvpnd", "httpsd", "fgfm")
    | summarize Failed = count(), Users = make_set(InitiatingProcessAccountName), Devices = make_set(DeviceName) by RemoteIP, bin(Timestamp, WindowMin)
    | where Failed >= FailedThreshold;
Failures
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### First successful FortiGate admin/SSL-VPN login from never-seen ASN after failure burst

`UC_51_7` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(Authentication.user) as users, values(Authentication.action) as actions from datamodel=Authentication where (Authentication.app=fortigate OR Authentication.app=sslvpn) earliest=-30d@d latest=-1h by Authentication.src_ip, Authentication.src_asn, Authentication.app | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | eventstats values(src_asn) as known_asns by app | eval is_baseline=1 | append [| tstats `summariesonly` count as recent_count, values(Authentication.user) as recent_users from datamodel=Authentication where (Authentication.app=fortigate OR Authentication.app=sslvpn) Authentication.action=success earliest=-1h by Authentication.src_ip, Authentication.src_asn, Authentication.app, _time span=5m | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | eval is_recent=1] | stats max(is_baseline) as seen_before, max(is_recent) as seen_recent, values(recent_users) as recent_users, values(recent_count) as recent_count, values(_time) as recent_time by src_asn, app | where seen_recent=1 AND isnull(seen_before) | table recent_time app src_asn recent_users recent_count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let Lookback = 30d;
let Recent = 1h;
let KnownASN = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp between (ago(Lookback) .. ago(Recent))
    | where RemotePort in (443, 10443, 4433) and InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("sslvpnd", "httpsd")
    | summarize by RemoteIP;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Recent)
| where RemotePort in (443, 10443, 4433)
| join kind=leftanti KnownASN on RemoteIP
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, DeviceId, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Machine-cadence post-auth FortiGate CLI/API calls in single session (MCP-orchestrated)

`UC_51_8` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, dc(Change.object) as distinct_objects, values(Change.command) as commands, values(Change.object) as objects, min(_time) as first_t, max(_time) as last_t from datamodel=Change where (Change.vendor_product="FortiGate" OR Change.app=fortigate) by Change.user, Change.src, Change.session_id, _time span=1m | `drop_dm_object_name(Change)` | eval duration_s=last_t-first_t, rate_per_s=count/(duration_s+1) | where count>=20 AND (rate_per_s>=2 OR duration_s<=10) | table _time user src session_id count distinct_objects duration_s rate_per_s commands objects
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let Window = 1m;
let BurstThreshold = 20;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemotePort in (443, 22, 8443) and InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("httpsd", "sshd", "cli")
| summarize Calls = count(), FirstT = min(Timestamp), LastT = max(Timestamp) by RemoteIP, DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, Window)
| extend DurationSec = datetime_diff('second', LastT, FirstT), RatePerSec = todouble(Calls) / (todouble(datetime_diff('second', LastT, FirstT)) + 1)
| where Calls >= BurstThreshold and (RatePerSec >= 2.0 or DurationSec <= 10)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Outbound JSON-RPC or LLM-API egress from network appliance / edge device

`UC_51_9` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, sum(Network_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out, values(Network_Traffic.dest_host) as dest_hosts, values(Network_Traffic.ssl_subject) as sni from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (Network_Traffic.src_category="network_appliance" OR Network_Traffic.src_category="firewall" OR Network_Traffic.src_category="edge_router") Network_Traffic.dest_port=443 by Network_Traffic.src, Network_Traffic.dest_host, _time span=10m | `drop_dm_object_name(Network_Traffic)` | search dest_host IN ("*anthropic.com", "*openai.com", "*bedrock-runtime*.amazonaws.com", "*generativelanguage.googleapis.com", "*api.mistral.ai", "*api.together.xyz", "*api.groq.com", "*api.deepseek.com") OR sni IN ("*anthropic.com", "*openai.com") | table _time src dest_host sni count bytes_out
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LLMHosts = dynamic(["anthropic.com", "api.anthropic.com", "openai.com", "api.openai.com", "bedrock-runtime", "generativelanguage.googleapis.com", "api.mistral.ai", "api.together.xyz", "api.groq.com", "api.deepseek.com"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemotePort == 443
| where RemoteUrl has_any (LLMHosts) or InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("sslvpnd", "httpsd", "miglogd", "fgfm", "forticron")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "code.exe", "slack.exe", "teams.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `zerodayclock.com`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 10 use case(s) fired, 19 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.